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The thesis examines the possibility of applying private 
sector retirement plan principles to the military retirement 
system. The increasing cost and generosity of military 
retirement coupled with political pressures to reduce federal 
spending have focused attention on reforming the military 
retirement system. Previous studies of the military 
retirement system are addressed and critiqued. Private 
retirement options are reviewed and a 401(k) plan is proposed 
to replace the current military retirement system. The new 
retirement system would eventually reduce federal outlays for 
military retirement by 66 percent while covering all service 
members. The role of retirement compensation in shaping 
force structure and retention are addressed. The thesis 
concludes that privatizing military retirement is feasible 
and less costly than the current military retirement system 
while still meeting most of the objectives of military 
retirement compensation. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The military compensation system has remained 
fundamentally unchanged since the end of World War II (Ref. 
1, p. xiii) . Over ten major studies have been conducted 
since 1945 analyzing the military compensation pay structure. 
Most of the studies have concentrated on three specific 
areas: 
1. Attracting and retaining quality personnel in 
sufficient numbers to accomplish the military's 
mission. 
2. Promoting an efficient distribution of service 
members by grade and years in service. 
3. Accomplishing these goals at least cost to the 
government. 
Retirement compensation is one part of the total pay 
structure for the military. This study will concentrate on 
the possibility of privatizing military retirement and its 
effect on force structure. Emphasis will be on attracting 
and retaining high quality individuals to the military by 
employing private sector compensation policies, reducing the 
cost to the government, and increasing employees flexibility 
and control of their financial future. 
The Republican takeover of both houses of Congress is 
accelerating efforts to reduce the power and scope of the 
federal government. A wave of government reforms is underway 
and the current movement to reinvent government is gaining 
momentum. Reforms such as eliminating entire cabinet 
positions and abolishing the IRS in favor of a much simpler 
tax system are getting very serious thought by many members 
of Congress. The prospect of rethinking the role of every 
government program and organization suggests that the climate 
is right for change. Congress will continue to look at new 
ways to decrease federal spending and the military retirement 
system may be scaled back or changed as part of an effort to 
reduce spending and balance the federal budget. 
The federal government, including the Department of 
Defense, is experiencing tremendous budgetary pressure to 
reduce cost. The military may gain some insight into 
innovative ways to cut cost by observing how corporate 
America has dealt with similar problems. For example, the 
competitive nature of the global economy has created new 
incentives for corporate America to reduce costs and has 
forced many large businesses to rethink their entire 
organizational and cost structure. In May of 1995, the 
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, citing 
cost reductions of 20 percent, endorsed outsourcing 
activities that need not be performed in the federal 
government. (Ref 28, p. ES-6) The military retirement system 
may be a government function that could be performed by 
private organizations. 
With respect to retirement policy, the trend in large 
businesses is to eliminate pensions and replace them with 
employee contribution plans such as 401(k)s and 403(b)s to 
reduce cost. (Ref. 3, p. 635) Today, 96 percent of all 
companies with more than 5000 employees offer 401(k) plans. 
(Ref. 2, p. 38) 
Large corporations have adopted 401(k)s which provide a 
wide range of tax deferred savings and investment options 
which give the employees improved flexibility and control 
over their investment options. These flexible retirement 
plans offered by many businesses have been used to attract 
employees to work for their company. This same approach may 
be successfully applied to the military. 
The military retirement system provides adequate 
compensation for the service members who stay in the military 
for twenty years or more. When the service member leaves the 
military after twenty years of service, the service member is 
entitled to a pension. However, any member who leaves the 
military prior to the twenty year point is normally not 
entitled to a military pension. Seventeen percent of all 
service members actually stay in the military for 20 years or 
more and receive retirement benefits. (Ref. 7, p. D-ll) This 
is in sharp contrast to the 65-90 percent participation rates 
of 401(k)s offered by private corporations.  (Ref. 2, p. 47) 
Those who stay in the military for greater than twenty 
years enjoy above average retirement benefits and the 
perceived assurance and stability of this benefit throughout 
the rest of their lifetime. Several government studies have 
shown that the value of the retirement benefit to service 
members far exceeds that received by their civilian 
counterparts, and the cost to the government has been 
significantly higher as well. (Ref. 5, p. 2, Ref. 6, p. IV- 
33) The high cost of military pensions relative to their 
civilian equivalents and the current budgetary climate 
suggest that the military pension is likely to be reduced. 
The objective of the military retirement system is to 
provide adequate compensation to attract and retain high 
quality individuals to serve in the armed forces. This 
objective must not be overlooked in any attempt' to redesign 
the military retirement system. The military must provide 
competitive compensation to attract the individuals that are 
needed for today's high technology military. However, there 
is significant budgetary pressure to reduce military 
retirement compensation. 
Privatizing the military retirement system may be an 
option that Congress will consider as part of this process. 
Adopting private sector retirement policies may provide 
better compensation for all service members at less cost to 
the government while enhancing the integrity and 
survivability of the military retirement system. 
Additionally, privatization would allow all service members 
to participate in the military's retirement plan. 
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Replacing traditional retirement plans such as pensions 
with 401(k)s and 403(b)s has created a portable retirement 
system in corporate America. When an employee switches jobs, 
he can simply "roll over" his existing retirement plan to his 
new place of employment. This has diminished incentives for 
employees to stay with a company for long periods of time. 
Most civilians will experience as many as eleven major job 
changes in their working lives. (Ref. 4, p. 161) 
However, the military cannot hire qualified individuals 
directly from the private sector to command ships, battalions 
and air wings. Qualified officers are developed over a 
period of time through experience and training. Thus 
retention of qualified officers and enlisted people is 
essential to maintaining the military's combat readiness. 
Privatizing the military retirement system may reduce the 
incentive to stay in the military and poses a significant 
limitation to the adoption of a private retirement plan. 
B.   OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the thesis is to explore alternate 
military retirement systems to reduce the cost to the 
government and increase employee flexibility and control of 
their financial future. The thesis will examine the 
possibility of privatizing the military retirement system and 
the potential impact of this action on retention. 
C.   RESEARCH  QUESTION 
The primary research question is: Can the Uniformed 
Services Retirement System be substantially modified to 
reduce the cost to the government and increase employees 
flexibility and control of their financial future without 
adversely affecting retention? Subsidiary research questions 
include the following: 
• What is the structure and logic of the existing 
retirement system for the U.S. military? 
• How fiscally sound is the current military retirement 
system? 
• What retirement policies available in the private 
sector might be adopted for use by the U.S. military? 
• Is a privatized retirement system for the military 
feasible? 
• How would the military force structure change under 
such a system? 
• What effect will privatizing the military retirement 
system have on retention? 
• What impact will these changes have on the officer 
ranks versus the enlisted ranks? 
• What will be the cost to the government for the new 
retirement system? 
• How will total compensation change for the individual 
service member and how will this compare to total 
compensation for civilians? 
• What should Congress do with the Military Retirement 
Fund? 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The thesis will begin with a brief description of the 
existing military retirement system, including the 
significant evolutionary changes. The impact on officer and 
enlisted retention from privatizing the military retirement 
system will be analyzed including the benefits, cost and 
management of the plan. Several private retirement plans 
such as defined contribution plans, profit sharing plans and 
defined benefit plans will be addressed and their 
applicability to the military will be examined. 
Several past studies recommending changes to military 
compensation will be reviewed and their relevant findings, 
and criticisms presented. Although the studies that will be 
presented do not address privatization of military 
retirement, many recommendations argue for or against 
adopting some private sector policies. 
Due to the sheer scope of military compensation policies, 
some issues will not be addressed in this study. This study 
concentrates on reinventing military retirement and will not 
examine other military pay structures such as base pay. The 
effect of the current retirement system on retention will be 
contrasted with a privatized plan. However, the impact on 
retention within or across the rank structure will not be 
examined. Additionally, the concept of personnel incentives 
for "effort motivation" will not be applied to military 
retirement benefits. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology will draw on previous 
government and private studies of military retirement 
compensation. Information will also be gathered from existing 
government   documents,    congressional   records   and   previous 
theses. 
The vast majority of large corporations have defined 
contribution plans in the form of 401(k)s. Various articles 
found in current publications and investment brochures will 
be used to explain these typical retirement plans. 
Statistical data from the Department of Defense and 
private studies will be used to analyze the incentives for 
service members staying in the military. This data will be 
applied to interpret the potential impact on retention by 
privatizing military retirement. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters presented as 
follows: 
Chapter I:   INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II:  BACKGROUND & EVOLUTION OF 
MILITARY  RETIREMENT 
Chapter II will place the military retirement system in 
its historical context and look at the development and 
evolution of military retirement. The adoption of accrual 
based accounting and the creation of the Military Retirement 
Fund have made the cost of military retirement more visible 
in the budgetary process. This visibility, coupled with an 
increased interest in cutting entitlement spending as part of 
deficit reduction, has put the military retirement budget in 
a more vulnerable position in the budget process. Changes to 
the retirement system, effected as part of deficit reduction 
in the early 1990s, will be explained. 
Chapter III  STUDIES OF ALTERNATE RETIREMENT 
SYSTEMS 
The military retirement compensation system has been the 
subject of more than ten major studies over the past 45 
years. Three of these studies address the major issues 
associated with reforming military retirement. These three 
studies present recommendations that may influence the 
possibility of privatization of military retirement and will 
be reviewed in this chapter. 
The first of these was the President's Commission on 
Military Compensation completed in 1978. This study 
recommended the establishment of a transition trust fund and 
annuity for members separating from service before the 20 
year point.  The findings of each of these studies as they 
relate to privatizing military retirement will be presented 
and critiqued. (Ref 13) 
The second study, completed by the Grace Commission in 
1983, concentrated on reducing cost to the government by 
adopting some private retirement compensation policies. The 
Commission did not study changes in force structure caused by 
the change in military compensation.  (Ref 20) 
The third study was conducted by the Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation in 1984. This study 
completed a rigorous analysis of the military retirement 
system, concentrating on efforts to improve force structure. 
The analysis generated 32 findings and 19 recommendations. 
The study recommended against a defined contribution plan. 
(Ref. 6, p. IV-33) 
Chapter IV   PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT OPTIONS 
This chapter will explain what is meant by the 
privatization of the military retirement system. A detailed 
description of popular corporate pension plans such as 
defined contribution plans, profit sharing plans, and defined 
benefit plans will be presented. The tremendous popularity 
of 401(k) plans and the shift from corporate pension plans to 
salary reduction plans will be discussed. 
Chapter V   THE PROPOSAL 
This chapter proposes to replace the current military 
retirement with a 401(k) plan.   The costs and logistics 
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associated with setting up and maintaining a large privatized 
retirement system will be shown as well as the financial 
benefits to the individual. The benefits and drawbacks of 
adopting a 401(k) retirement plan to the military and the 
individual service member will be addressed. 
Chapter   VI      RETIREMENT   COMPENSATION   AND 
FORCE    MANAGEMENT 
The relationship between retirement compensation and 
retention will be examined and criticism of the current 
twenty year retirement system will be addressed. The effect 
of the adoption of a privatized military retirement system on 
force structure will be discussed. 
Privatizing the military retirement system will also 
present problems for the management of the Military 
Retirement Fund (MRF). Several options for dealing with this 
fund    will    be    examined. These    options    will    include 
grandfathering the current retirement system or allocating 
the entire MRF, based on longevity or historical accrual 
rates,   to all  individuals within the military. 
Chapter   VII   CONCLUSIONS    AND    RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will  summarize the thesis and present the 
major conclusions.     A concise presentation of the benefits, 
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cost and problems with privatizing the military retirement 
system will be addressed. 
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II.   BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the origins and evolution of the military- 
retirement system is essential to placing the retirement 
system in its current context. This chapter will explore the 
origins of and major legislative changes to the military 
retirement system. The current military retirement system 
will be described as well as congressional perceptions and 
recently proposed legislation affecting funding for military 
retirement. 
B. EVOLUTION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
1.   1855 - 1984 
The origins of the military retirement system can be 
traced back to an 1855 statute that provided for the 
compulsory retirement of certain Navy officers. The statute 
gave the Secretary of the Navy the authority to involuntarily 
separate naval officers who were determined to be incapable 
of performing their duty through no fault of their own. 
Usually officers were separated due to age or disability and 
were given either leave of absence pay (75 percent of sea 
duty pay) or furlough pay (50 percent of leave of absence 
pay).  (Ref 10, pp. 371-372) 
Voluntary non-disability retirement was first 
established on August 3, 1861 for regular officers of all 
branches with greater than 40 years of service.  Two other 
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laws passed in 1861 and 1862 broadened military retirement to 
include involuntary non-disability retirement for officers 
from all branches of the military with greater than 45 years 
of service. Additionally, involuntary separation was set at 
age 62 for all services. (Ref 10, p. 372) 
Several other minor modifications to military 
retirement were effected between 1870 and 1899 and are 
summarized below.  (Ref 10, p. 372) 
• Retired pay compensation was based on a newly created 
active duty pay system. 
• Army and Marine Corps officers were authorized to 
voluntarily retire with 30 years of active service. 
• Mandatory retirement for all officers was raised to 
age 64. 
In 1899, the military retirement system was modified 
again to improve promotional opportunities within the Navy. 
This was the first time that military retirement was used 
specifically to effect force composition. Under this system, 
officers of the ranks of Lieutenant through Captain could 
request voluntary separation regardless of age or length of 
service. The names of the volunteers were put on a waiting 
list and, if a specified number of vacancies were not opened 
by normal attrition, these officers were retired early. (Ref 
10, p. 373) 
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The Act of August 29, 1916 introduced two new ideas to 
military nondisability compensation and established the basis 
for the current retirement system. The first was to 
implement an up-or-out philosophy; the second was to create a 
formula to calculate military retirement pay that remained in 
effect until 1980. The monthly formula to calculate retired 
pay was established as final monthly basic pay multiplied by 
2.5 percent for each year of service, not to exceed 75 
percent. (Ref 10, p. 373) 
From 1922 to 1984, several minor or temporary 
legislative changes were enacted. (Ref 10, pp. 373 - 378, Ref 
6, pp. VII-12 to VII-17) 
• The retirement system was twice used by the Army to 
effect a reduction in strength. Temporary early 
retirement for Army officers was authorized to reduce 
an excessive officer population in the middle ranks. 
Officers with as little as 10 years of active duty 
were chosen to retire and received the standard 
formula to calculate retirement pay. (Act of June 30, 
1922, Act of July 31, 1935) 
• Establishment of the voluntary retirement age at 
twenty years in service. (1938 Navy, 1948 Army and Air 
Force) 
• Mandatory retirement was lowered to 62 from 64 (1946) 
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. Reserve and National Guard personnel were added to the 
retirement system. 
• Retired pay adjustment procedures were converted to a 
new COLA system. 
• A unified retirement authority for all military 
services was established. (Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act of 1980) 
• As part of an effort to decrease retirement costs, the 
"High Three Average" for calculating retirees' pay was 
adopted. The average of the service member's highest 
three years of basic pay was used to calculate the 
monthly pension instead of using final basic pay. 
(Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981) 
2.   1984 - Present 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1984 adopted accrual 
based accounting and created the Military Retirement Fund. 
The Military Retirement Fund was created to provide a means 
for Congress to budget for future retirement costs associated 
with current manpower decisions. Adopting accrual based 
accounting allowed future retirement outlays to be recognized 
as a future liability and thus the total cost of current 
manpower decisions was evident. 
This Act also made three other changes to the retirement 
system expressly to reduce the cost of military retirement. 
These changes included (1) "rounding down" to the next lowest 
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full month to determine retirement pay multipliers (2) 
"rounding down" to the next lowest full dollar for monthly 
retired pay and (3) prohibiting retirees from basing their 
monthly retired pay on the preceding pay scale as adjusted 
for inflation. (Ref 10, p. 379) 
"Armed with information gained from the new accrual 
accounting system, Congress next took action to require a 
$2.9 billion reduction in nondisability retirement cost 
accruals for 1986". (Ref 10 p. 380) The Military Retirement 
Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes to military 
retirement designed specifically to reduce cost. The same 
percentage multiplier of 2.5 percent was used to calculate 
the initial monthly retirement pay. However, the monthly 
retirement pay was reduced by one percentage point for each 
year that the member retires with less than 30 years of 
service. Once a retired member with less than 3 0 years of 
service reaches age 62, his retired pay will be increased as 
if the reduction in the pay multiplier had not been in place. 
In several instances over the past decade, Congress has 
delayed the COLA increase for federal retirees as a means to 
curtail federal spending. In 1993, the Concurrent Resolution 
on the Budget for FY 1994 assigned deficit reduction targets 
for military and civil service retirement costs. The Armed 
Services Committees achieved the required deficit reduction 
for the military by delaying COLAs for military retirees in 
FY 94 through FY 98, saving $2,358 billion.  The Governmental 
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Affairs Committee met the required deficit reduction for 
civil servants by also delaying COLAs, saving $788 million. 
(Ref 11, P. S8079) 
However, since the deficit reduction targets were 
different for each group and with little coordination between 
the two committees, the size of the COLA delays for the 
military and the civil service were different. Consequently, 
civil servants would obtain their COLAs as much as 9 months 
earlier than military retirees during the period from FY 94 - 
FY 98. This created a sense of inequity between the military 
and civil servant retirees, an issue that remains unresolved 
today. 
C.   THE EXISTING MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
The current military retirement system is a funded, 
noncontributory  defined-benefit  plan  that  includes 
nondisability retired pay, disability retired pay, retired 
pay for reserve service and a survivor annuity program. (Ref 
8 p. 1)  The breakdown of payments for each category is shown 
in Figure 2.1. 
The system provides benefits for members of the Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. However, most of the 
specifications also apply to the retirement systems of the 
Coast Guard, the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health 
Service and the Commissioned Corps of the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration.  (Ref 8 p. 1) 
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Breakdown of Payments Within the 
Military Retirement Fund, FY 1994 
(dollars in billions) 





v      Pay($1.92B)7% 
Disability Pay 
($1.51B)6% 
Source: Statistical Report on the Military 




Service members are eligible to receive retirement 
benefits after twenty years of military service subject to 
service secretary approval. Successive changes in 
legislation have created three separate nondisability benefit 
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formulas to calculate the monthly pension benefit, depending 
on when the service member initially entered service. The 
three retirement formulas are outlined below. 
1. Members Entering Service Before September 8, 
1980 
Retirement pay for retirees who entered service prior to 
September 8, 1980 is calculated by multiplying their final 
basic pay by 2.5 percent, not to exceed 75 percent. This 
retirement formula is commonly called "FINAL PAY" because the 
monthly retirement benefit is calculated using the retiree's 
last monthly basic pay. Nondisability retirement benefits 
are received throughout the. retiree's lifetime. The 
retirement pay is adjusted annually by the same percentage 
change as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This is commonly 
referred to as full CPI protection or CPI indexing. (Ref 8 
pp. 1-4) 
2. Members Entering Service After September 8, 
1980 
Retirement pay for members who entered service after 
September 8, 1980 is calculated using a similar formula as 
above. However, the average of the basic pay for the last 
three years of the service member's active duty is used 
instead of the final basic pay. For this reason, this 
retirement formula is commonly called "HI-3".  The retirement 
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pay is also subject to full CPI protection for these members. 
(Ref 8 pp. 1-4) 
3.   Members Entering Service After August 1, 1986 
Retirement pay for members who entered service after 
August 1, 1986 is calculated identically to the "HI-3" 
formula except a reduction is applied if the service member 
retires prior to 30 years of service. The monthly retirement 
pay is subjected to a penalty of one percentage point for 
each year of service less than 3 0 years. At age 62, the 
retired pay is recomputed without the penalty. This 
retirement formula is commonly called "REDUX" because the 
penalty applied reduces monthly retirement pay. The 
retirement pay is adjusted annually by the CPI minus 1 
percent. However, at age 62, the retirement pay is increased 
by the amount that would have been payable if the full CPI 
increase had been in effect. Subsequent to this increase, 
partial indexing resumes at CPI minus 1 percent annually for 
the rest of the service member's life.  (Ref 8 pp. 1-4) 
D.   THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND 
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 
(Public Law 98-94) created the Military Retirement Fund as a 
means to budget for future retirement costs.  In addition, 
the Military Retirement Fund provides benefits for disability 
pay and survivor benefits.   The purpose of the Military 
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Retirement Fund as laid out by federal statute is shown 
below. 
There is established on the books of the 
Treasury a fund to be known as the Department of 
Defense Military Retirement Fund, which shall be 
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. The 
fund shall be used for the accumulation of funds in 
order to finance on an actuarially sound basis 
liabilities of the Department of Defense under 
military retirement and survivor benefit programs. 
10 U.S.C. § 1461 
Prior to the adoption of accrual based accounting, the 
military retirement system was a pay-as-you-go system. That 
is, as retirement liabilities arose, they were funded by 
current congressional appropriations. The fund and the new 
accounting system became effective on October 1, 1984. As a 
result, the previous unfunded future liability accrued before 
this date, not recognized by the previous accounting system, 
became evident under the new accrual based accounting. 
The initial accrued unfunded liability as of September 
30, 1984 was $528.7 billion. (Ref 9, p. 12) The unfunded 
liability was amortized over a period of 60 years with 
payments made to the Military Retirement Fund by the Treasury 
to be completed by the year 2043. Changes in the amount of. 
the unfunded liability "owed" to the Fund may arise because 
of changes in economic assumptions, changes in the benefit 
formula for retired pay or variances between actual and 
expected gains and losses to the fund. 
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The Military Retirement Fund is a trust fund that 
invests in special issue government securities bearing an 
interest rate determined by the Treasury that is reflective 
of current market conditions. Currently, each security issued 
to the fund is mirrored by an equivalent Treasury security 
issued to the public that has an identical maturity date and 
coupon rate. The securities held by the Fund can be redeemed 
by the Fund manager at current market value to meet present 
cash flow needs.  (Ref 9 p. 5) 
The fund is financed from three sources as shown in 
Figure 2.2 on the following page. The funded portion is 
financed from the Department of Defense's Military Personnel 
Account (051) . The Secretary, of Defense is required to 
allocate funds to the Military Retirement Fund at the end of 
each month based on actuarial estimates. (Ref 12 p. 25) The 
actuarial estimate is based on "normal cost" and is called 
the "retirement accrual charge". The normal cost is a 
percent of basic pay necessary to fund future retirement 
benefits and is shown in Table 2.1. 
The normal cost changes over time because of the changes 
in economic assumptions and changes in retirement benefits. 
Congress pays for the retirement accrual charge by 
automatically increasing the Military Personnel Account by 
the amount necessary to pay for future retirees. 
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CASH FLOW FOR THE MILITARY RETIREMENT 
FUND, FY 1993 
































Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System, 
Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, 
1993 
Figure 2 .2 
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Table 2.1 









Nondisability Benefits 34.1% 
Disability Benefits 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Survivor Benefits 
Total 
1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 
42.2% 37.1% 31.5% 36.0% 
PART-TIME 
Ll.l % 10.3% 9.3% 10.1% 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Nondisability Benefits  11 1
Disability Benefits 
Survivor Benefits 
Total 11.7%      10.8%  9.8%   10.6% 
Source:  Valuation of the Military Retirement System, 
 Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, 1993 
The unfunded liability is financed from the Treasury 
via the Central Personnel Management Account (805). These 
amortized payments are transferred to the Military Retirement 
Fund at the beginning of each fiscal year and will continue 
until the year 2043. 
Adopting accrual based accounting allowed future 
retirement outlays to be recognized as a future liability and. 
thus the total cost of current manpower decisions was 
evident. In other words, the Department of Defense had to 
pay for retirement benefits as they were earned. Thus, any 
change that decreased retirement benefits of new entrants 
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would immediately reduce budget authority and federal outlays 
to the Military Retirement Fund. This would not affect the 
deficit in the near term because the military retirement fund 
is funded by intragovernmental transfers; however, it would 
reduce apparent Defense appropriations. Therefore, Congress 
could reduce current year Defense appropriations by reducing 
retirement benefits of new entrants, without affecting 
current retirees. This provided a less painful alternative 
for Congress to reduce Defense spending. 
E.   COST COMPARISONS WITH CIVILIAN COMPENSATION PLANS 
Several government and private studies have shown that 
military retirement compensation far exceeds typical civilian 
pensions. 
In April 1978, the President's Commission on Military 
Compensation completed a thorough review of the entire 
structure of military pay, benefits and retirement. Two 
findings of the Commission relating to military retirement 
indicated that the cost of the military retirement system was 
excessive. The Commission found that military retirement, 
"which allows retirement after 20 years of service at half of 
basic pay, can no longer be justified, and that compensation 
should be more cost effective because the nation cannot 
afford to waste tax payer's dollars".  (Ref 13 p. 2) 
The Department of Defense conducted its own study on 
military retirement in 1984.  The Fifth Quadrennial Review of 
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Military Compensation conducted the study, concluding that 
military retirement costs the government 1.2 to 2.0 times the 
average of a large sample of private-sector plans.  (Ref 6, 
p. IV-6) 
Two years later, in 1986, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) conducted a study that compared military compensation 
with similar civilian jobs in the private sector. The GAO 
made two significant findings: "Military compensation 
exceeded the compensation of all civilian workers in the vast 
majority of our specific comparisons and, military fringe 
benefits were considerably more generous than civilian 
benefits." (Ref 5 p. 2) 
However, the GAO does point out that military pay may 
need to be higher because of the different mix of 
occupations, greater responsibility incurred by military 
personnel than typical civilian counterparts, and frequent 
moves that make it difficult for spouses to maintain a 
career. GAO also asserts that the added danger and the 24 
hour a day job liability without extra pay may justify 
increased salaries. 
More recently, on July 10, 1995, the Concord Coalition 
released its study of federal pensions which compared 
military and civil service retirement pensions to those in 
the private sector. (Ref 14 pp. 1-4) The Concord Coalition 
notes the significant differences in normal cost between 
private sector retirement plans and military retirement. 
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Normal cost is an actuarial term and is the usual standard 
for comparing federal pay and benefits with the private 
sector. It refers to the flat percentage of pay that would 
have to be contributed, throughout an employee's work tenure, 
to cover the cost of that employee's lifetime pension 
benefits. The employer cost of a typical private-sector 
pension plan plus Social Security is 12.2 percent of payroll. 
The normal cost of military pensions is 3 6.4 percent of 
payroll. Including the 6.2 percent for Social Security 
(under which all military personnel are automatically 
covered) yields a total employer cost for the military 
retirement package of 42.6 percent of payroll, 3.5 times the 
equivalent private-sector figure. 
However, the Concord Coalition fails to point out that 
the normal cost the military uses is based on basic pay and 
not total "payroll". Basic Pay is only a fraction of total 
active duty compensation and thus is not a reliable basis for 
comparison. The Department of Defense uses Regular Military 
Compensation (RMC) to compare military salaries to their 
typical civilian counterparts. The RMC includes basic pay, 
quarters allowance (either cash or in kind), subsistence 
allowance (either cash or in kind), variable housing 
allowance and the tax advantage associated with the tax 
exempt status of the allowances. 
For  a  20  year  retiree,  basic  pay  represents 
approximately 72 percent of RMC, and for a 30 year retiree, 
28 
basic pay represents approximately 57 percent of RMC. (Ref 
8, p. 6) Therefore the comparable normal cost for a 20 year 
and 3 0 year retiree are 2 6.2 percent and 2 0.7 percent 
respectively. The normal cost for military personnel is 
actually between 1.7 and 2.1 times that of a typical civilian 
employer's normal cost. These numbers correlate closely with 
the retirement cost comparison estimates calculated by the 
QRMC. 
Current military retirees are receiving COLAs, although 
delayed, fully indexed to the CPI. The Concord Coalition 
points out in its report that only a small fraction of 
private pensions receive any inflation adjustment, and 
virtually none receive annual CPI COLAs. 
The Concord Coalition also criticizes the military 
pension system's early retirement ages, which now average 42 
for enlisted men and 46 for officers. "Many believe it is a 
costly and unnecessary waste of skills and training for the 
typical military pensioner to spend more years collecting 
benefits (an average of 35 years) than earning them (an 
average of 22 years)". (Ref 14 p. 3) In comparison, the 
average retirement age in the private sector is 62. 
F.   CONGRESS,  THE DEFICIT AND MILITARY RETIREMENT 
In 1995, the federal debt exceeded 4.8 trillion dollars, 
approaching 7 0 percent of Gross Domestic Product for the 
first time in over 45 years.  (Ref 15)  The President's FY 
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1996 budget proposal continues to anticipate chronic budget 
deficits in the range of 200 billion dollars every year for 
the foreseeable future. (Ref 15) Subsequently, on June 13, 
President Clinton submitted a second budget proposal that was 
claimed to produce a balanced budget by 2005. However, the 
Congressional Budget Office analyzed the President's plan and 
reported that a deficit of $209 billion would still be 
present in 2005. (Ref 27, pp. 1715 - 1719) 
In 1994, the Republicans campaigned on a balanced budget 
platform as well as many other, significant reforms aimed at 
reducing the scope of the federal government. The election 
results of November of .1994 overwhelmingly favored 
Republicans, suggesting public support for deficit reduction. 
Congressional lawmakers have interpreted the Republican 
victory as a mandate to balance the federal budget. On July 
1, 1995 the House and Senate adopted a Budget Resolution 
calling for the elimination of the deficit in seven years at 
an estimated reduction in spending of over 1.1 trillion 
dollars.(Ref 21 p. 1899) 
Since 1980, legislative changes to military retirement 
have established a trend by Congress to reduce military 
retirement benefits. In the context of the current budgetary 
climate and the federal deficit, this trend appears to be 
accelerating. For example, former Congressman Timothy J. 
Penny had this observation regarding COLAs. (Ref 18) 
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I think COLAs are bad public policy. When you 
automatically inflation-adjust the budget and 
guarantee half the budget a. cost of living 
increase, it is a formula for a growing deficit. 
It  is unsustainable. 
In a recent letter to constituents, Senator Allen 
Simpson stated his view of military retirement: "This is 
an   extraordinarily   generous   system  by   any   standard". 
(Ref  16) 
Senator Judd Gregg headed up a task force in 1995 that 
recommended three caps on annual cost-of-living adjustments 
to military retirees and active duty service members. The 
first cap would reduce the COLA for active duty service 
members to the CPI minus .5 percent reflecting the growing 
belief that the CPI is overstated. The second would 
eliminate any COLA for military retirees under the age of 62. 
This COLA cap would cut retirement earnings by as much as 30 
percent over a retiree's lifetime. The third cap would apply 
the COLA increase only to the first $13,800 of annual retired 
pay. This maximum amount was picked because it is the 
maximum amount that can be received in Social Security 
benefits.(Ref 17) 
The Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich, 
has similar views on military retirement. Although his 
legislative intentions are not known, he has in past years 
criticized military retirement  as  too  generous  and 
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recommended changes similar to those of Senator Gregg's task 
force.  (Ref 17) 
The unfunded liability in the Military Retirement Fund 
is also creating congressional concern. Then Representative 
Timothy J. Penny is quoted in 1993 as saying "We have got a 
real nightmare facing us in not too many years down the road 
as we try to finance a very expensive retirement program when 
there is really no money coming in to pay the bills." (Ref 
17) In November of 1993, a lead article on the front page of 
the Washington Post titled "Government Has Massive Pension 
Fund Shortfall" clearly indicates that the unfunded liability 
is attracting significant attention.(Ref 18) 
Regarding this unfunded liability, Dallas Salisbury, 
president of Employee Benefit Research Institute, had this 
observation: (Ref 18) 
It is huge. There is a burden being left on future 
taxpayers. The unfunded liabilities are setting up 
a situation of jeopardy for the federal retiree. 
I'm not afraid the government won't be here to make 
the payment. I'm afraid they won't make the 
payment even though they are here. 
Congressional perception has translated into several 
congressional bills. In Response to Senator Gregg's task 
force's recommendation, Senator Kerrey and Senator Simpson 
have sponsored three bills that will reduce military 
retirement benefits. Senate Bill 820 will reduce the accrual 
rate used to calculate pensions to 2 percent per year 
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regardless of how many years of service an individual may 
have. Currently, the accrual rate is 2.5 percent for each 
year of service, reduced by one percentage point for each 
year served less than 30 years of service. This bill would 
be retroactive to any member entering service after July 31, 
1986.  Senate Bill 821 focuses on a downward adjustment in 
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the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI, used to calculate 
the COLAs of military retirees, is perceived to overstate 
true inflation by one to two percentage points. Senate Bill 
822 would impose limits on the COLAs of all military retirees 
except the thirty percent who receive the smallest pensions. 
These retirees would continue to receive their full COLA 
increase.  (Ref 16) 
6.   SUMMARY 
The legislative history of military retirement clearly 
shows that military retirement has been used as a force 
management tool. However, since 1981, the predominant 
legislative changes to military retirement have been to 
reduce the costs and the benefits of the system. 
The creation of the Military Retirement Fund in 1984 has 
made the cost of retirement compensation more visible in the 
federal budgetary process. The ability of Congress to reduce 
current year Defense appropriations by reducing retirement 
benefits of new entrants provides a less painful alternative 
for Congress to reduce Defense spending. 
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The current austere budgetary climate coupled with past 
studies showing that military retirement is overly generous 
and the sheer magnitude of the unfunded liability suggest 
continued pressure to reduce future retirement benefits. 
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III.   STUDIES OF ALTERNATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Extensive analysis has been undertaken and effort 
expended in studying military retirement compensation 
policies over the past 45 years. Numerous changes to the 
military retirement system have been recommended. Emphasis 
has been given to changing military retirement to a more 
flexible force management tool as well as reducing the cost 
of retirement benefits. Several of the recommended changes 
have been sweeping while others have only been minor 
adjustments. However, the majority of the recommendations 
from these studies has not been acted upon and.consequently 
the military retirement system has remained fundamentally 
unchanged since the end of World War II. 
B .   PURPOSE OF MILITARY RETIREMENT 
The purpose of military retirement must be clearly 
understood before any attempt is made to alter it. The 
purpose and principles of military retirement have been 
evolving since the Hook Commission completed the first 
comprehensive analysis of military retirement in 1948. The 
best current statement of the goals of military retirement, 
as outlined in the Military Compensation Background Papers, 
is presented below. 
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1. The choice of career service in the armed forces 
should be competitive with reasonably available 
alternatives. 
2. Promotion opportunities must be open for young and 
able members. 
3. Some measure of economic security must be available 
to members after retirement from career military- 
service. 
4. A pool of experienced personnel must be maintained 
who would be subject to recall to active duty 
during time of war or national emergency. (Ref 10 
p.  371) 
These goals clearly indicate that military retirement 
serves as both a force management tool and a retirement plan 
that is competitive with typical civilian plans which provide 
economic security to employees. 
The President's Commission on Military Compensation in 
1978, the Grace Commission in 1983 and The Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation in 1984 are significant 
studies that address the major issues associated with 
reforming military retirement. The significant findings and 
recommendations of these studies are presented below. 
C.   PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MILITARY  COMPENSATION 
The President's Commission on Military Compensation 
(PCMC)  was formed in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter, 
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following the shift to an All Volunteer Force (AVF). The 
purpose of the Commission was to complete a comprehensive 
analysis on the entire military pay structure. The President 
specifically asked the Commission to propose a single 
integrated long term compensation plan that would be fair to 
the service members as well as the taxpayers. Implicit in 
this charge was the expectation that the Commission's report 
would not become a long series of unheeded studies. (Ref 13, 
p. 8) 
The PCMC, although committed to studying all forms of 
military compensation, allocated the majority of its efforts 
to military retirement. The Commission regarded retirement 
compensation as the key issue because of the growing cost of 
retirement benefits and the amount of attention the system 
was receiving from Congress. The philosophy of the PCMC 
was to modify military compensation to be more cost 
effective, flexible and fair. 
Under this philosophy, the Commission made one general, 
but significant finding relative to military retirement and 
recommended several relevant changes. They concluded that 
the military retirement program, which allows retirement 
after 20 years of service at half of basic pay, can no longer 
be justified. (Ref 13 p. 2) The Commission recommended 
establishing a new noncontributory retirement plan consisting 
of three parts: a retirement annuity to provide for old-age 
needs; a trust fund to provide deferred compensation; and 
37 
along with the trust fund, severance pay to assist former 
service members in their adjustments to civilian life. 
The recommended elements for the retirement annuities to 
meet old age income needs are outlined below. 
a. Eligibility for a deferred annuity be established 
at age 55, 60 or 62 depending on years of service, 
starting at 10 years. 
b. Annuity levels should be similar to those earned in 
the federal civil service employment. 
c. Social Security benefits should be partially 
integrated with retirement annuities. 
d. Retirement annuities should have inflation 
protection. 
e. Health care, exchange, and commissary benefits for 
most annuitants should continue. 
f. Military and civil service retirement plans should 
be fully integrated; no dual compensation.  (Ref 13 
p. 3) 
A deferred compensation trust fund was recommended to be 
created to increase retention and to provide income for 
service members with 10 or more years of service. The 
Commission recommended government-paid credits after 5 years 
of service and withdrawal options consistent with the primary 
purpose of deferred compensation, in order to aid service 
members in their transition to civilian life after 10 or more 
years of active duty.  (Ref 13 p.  3) 
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The PCMC essentially argued that twenty year vesting is 
unfair to the majority of service members who do not serve in 
the military for twenty years. Consequently, 10 year vesting 
was proposed to allow members with between 10 and 20 years of 
service to obtain a deferred annuity. Under this plan, DOD 
would make annual payments to a trust fund for each service 
member based on base pay and years of service. The trust 
fund would be invested in interest bearing government 
securities. When the service member left military service, 
the accrued retirement benefit in the trust fund could be 
withdrawn as a lump sum or rolled over to another retirement 
plan.  (Ref 19, p. 33) 
The PCMC argued that offering cash benefits to service 
members with between 10 and 20 years of service would provide 
DOD with a more flexible and rational force management tool. 
(Ref 19, p. 33) 
The primary criticism of the PCMC was that its goals for 
military retirement were inconsistent with the stated goals 
of the Department of Defense. The PCMC favored a complicated 
early withdrawal system which made it difficult to encourage 
separation from service at the proper point. The proposals 
of the PCMC were modified by DOD and submitted to Congress as 
the Uniformed Services Retirement Benefit Act (USRBA) in 
1979, but Congress did not act upon it. 
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D.   GRACE  COMMISSION 
A second significant change to military retirement was 
proposed by the President's Private Sector Survey (PPSS) in 
1984, better known as the Grace Commission. President Reagan 
created the PPSS as a broad based attempt to reduce costs and 
inefficiencies in the federal government. The PPSS generated 
over 2400 recommendations for changes in federal government 
programs at an estimated cost savings of $424.4 billion over 
three years. The scope of the study covered 784 issues in 
government, of which military retirement was one. 
The PPSS sought to reduce costs and inefficiencies in 
the federal government by applying management concepts widely 
used in corporate America. 
1.  Proposals 
a. Service members that complete more than 20 years of 
service would only receive full and unreduced 
annuities at age 62. 
b. The formula for calculating military retirement pay 
would use a reduced multiplier of 1.6 percent of 
Basic Military Compensation (BMC) . BMC is 
equivalent to basic pay, allowances for quarters, 
subsistence and the tax advantages that arise from 
these allowances, which is about the equivalent of 
2.1 percent of basic pay. 
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c. Retirement pay would be reduced by the share of 
Social Security that was earned during military 
service. 
d. COLAs for retirees would be reduced to the lower of 
the percentage of the CPI or the percentage change 
in BMC. After the retiree reaches his 62nd 
birthday and becomes eligible for Social Security, 
the COLA increase would be reduced to only one 
third of the CPI increase. 
e. Surprisingly, the PPSS also recommended increasing 
benefits for service members leaving service with 
between 10 and 19 years of service. The PPSS 
argued that the vesting time frame be reduced for 
service members with between 10 and 19 years of 
service. However, annuities would begin only after 
age 62. (Ref. 20, p. 35) 
2.   Criticisms 
The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
(QRMC), General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) all reviewed the recommendations of the 
Grace Commission. The consensus was that the Grace 
Commission did not adequately study or anticipate the effect 
of the changes to the military retirement system on retention 
and thus, force structure.  The Grace Commission focused 
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primarily on cost reduction and ignored much of the impact of 
their recommendations. (Ref. 20, p. 38, Ref 6, p. IV-36) 
E.   FIFTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION 
A thorough review of the principles and purposes of 
military compensation was mandated by Section 100(b) of Title 
37, United States Code and was to be presented to Congress 
every four years. (Ref 6, p. 1-1) The Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) conducted one of the 
most comprehensive and rigorous studies on military 
retirement in 1984, concentrating on efforts to improve force 
structure. The analysis generated 32 findings and 19 
recommendations. Those which are significant and relevant 
are presented below. 
1.   Significant Findings 
a. The Military Retirement System is not an old-age 
pension but is a force management tool. 
b. The current retirement system is a powerful career 
incentive exerting its influence at the 8-12 year 
point. 
c. The enlisted career force is more sensitive to 
retired pay changes than the officer force. 
d. The current retirement system can be restructured 
to increase force readiness at less cost. 
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e. Reducing retirement benefits without increasing 
compensation will negatively impact the career 
force, and thus, reduce mission readiness. 
f. Earlier vesting for a deferred benefit costs more 
and is of no value to mission readiness. The 
earlier vesting issue is one of equity. 
g. A contributory retirement system would have to be 
offset by an equal or greater percentage of the 
member's contribution. 
h.   Only those who separate early stand to gain from a 
contributory system, 
i.   Military retirement costs are 1.2 to 2.0 times the 
average of large private sector plans. 
The QRMC also produced four primary alternatives for 
restructuring and strengthening the current military 
retirement system. These alternatives concentrated primarily 
on reallocating retirement dollars to improve force 
structure. (Ref 6, p. IV-29) 
2.   Significant Recommendations 
The findings of the QRMC translated into several 
recommendations. The QRMC maintained that the purpose of the 
military retirement system should not be changed. The 
military retirement system does not have the same objectives 
as civilian retirement plans. 
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The impact on force structure should be fully analyzed 
before any attempt is made to change military retirement. 
This recommendation is in response to the sweeping reforms 
recommended by the Grace Commission without a concomitant 
analysis of the effects on force structure. (Ref 6, p. IV-35) 
The QRMC also went against the recommendations of the 
PCMC which argued that vesting times be reduced from twenty 
years to ten years. The QRMC conceded that reducing vesting 
times for service members was an issue of fairness but it 
would cost more and does not contribute to mission readiness. 
(Ref 6, p. IV-35) 
The system should remain non-contributory for the 
service member. This recommendation echoed several other 
studies dating as far back as 1961. The QRMC argued that the 
government would not gain by adopting a contributory policy 
since it would only be supplementing a forced savings plan 
for members leaving the military. Only the service members 
who leave service and withdraw their accrued benefits upon 
separation would gain. There would be no benefit to mission 
readiness. (Ref 6, p. IV-35) 
No explicit integration with Social Security should be 
undertaken. The QRMC asserts that "Social Security benefits 
have been, and are expected to be, less than for comparable 
private-sector earnings as a result of contribution only on 
basic pay rather than basic military compensation (BMC)." 
(Ref 6, p. IV-33)  This establishes an implicit, partial 
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integration with Social Security. In addition, enlisted 
members would be impacted to a greater extent if Social 
Security is explicitly integrated with the military 
retirement system. (Ref 6, p. IV-33) 
The QRMC concentrated primarily on preserving or 
expanding the force management objectives of military 
retirement. Little attention was given to equity, reducing 
the cost or increasing the competitiveness of military 
retirement with civilian compensation plans. However, 
military retirement cost reductions realized through the 
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 were a direct result 
of some of the recommendations of the Fifth QRMC. (Ref 20, 
p. 36) 
F.   SUMMARY 
Despite the influences and recommendations of the many 
studies of military retirement, the system has remained 
fundamentally unchanged since 1948. The majority of studies 
have been narrowly focused either on cost reduction, force 
management or fairness and have seemingly ignored other 
possibilities for accomplishing the military's retirement 
objectives while meeting all of these goals. 
There have been no significant studies of or proposals 
for privatizing military retirement. However, many concepts 
addressed in these three studies are relevant to a privatized 
retirement plan and may be integrated into a single 
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retirement system which meets the stated goals of military 
retirement. 
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IV.   PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT OPTIONS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The origin of private retirement plans dates back to the 
American Express Company which, in 1875, offered the first 
formal pension plan provided by an employer. (Ref 22, p. 69) 
The historical legislative changes in private pension plans 
are almost as long as those of military retirement. However, 
the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974 stands out as the most significant.  The 
goals of ERISA have been to (1) decrease the pension loss 
associated with job changes,  (2) ensure that funding is 
adequate,  (3)  ensure that workers receive sufficient 
information to evaluate their plan, and (4) provide for new 
types of tax qualified defined contribution plans.  (Ref 22, 
p. 88) 
Ironically, it wasn't until 1984 that the federal 
government imposed the same standard for full funding of 
retirement benefits to the military that it required of 
private pensions since 1974. No effort has been made in the 
military retirement system to decrease the pension loss 
associated with job changes or to ensure that workers receive 
sufficient information to evaluate their plan. This 
reflects the different goals associated with military 
retirement. 
The passage of ERISA had an unintended side effect on 
the profile of pensions in the United States.  The evolving 
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regulations accelerated by ERISA significantly increased the 
employer cost of defined benefit plans. (Ref 22, p. 115) As 
a result, employers and employees began to negotiate defined 
contribution plans. This established a trend away from 
defined benefit plans and towards defined contribution plans. 
Further tax and regulatory legislation in the 1980's that 
favored defined contribution plans accelerated this trend. 
B.   RETIREMENT  PLANS 
1.   Defined Benefit Plans 
Defined benefit plans have been the traditional 
retirement pension offered by many private companies. The 
benefits that a retiree receives from the company are 
determined in advance and are not dependent on the 
performance of the pension investment. The actuarial accrual 
of retirement benefits is dependent on a previously defined 
formula which differs widely among individual companies. 
The company is responsible for funding the previously 
determined retirement benefits to the pension account. The 
risk to the employee, largely centers around the long term 
financial health of the company. If a company fails 
financially, it may be unable to pay the retirement benefits 
promised to its employees. The retirement annuity payments 
usually continue until death regardless of life expectancy of 
the recipient. The pension payments stop at time of death 
unless a survivor benefit plan is provided.  The current 
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military retirement system is a defined benefit plan. (Ref 
22, pp. 19-32) 
2.   Defined Contribution Plans 
Defined contribution plans are retirement plans where 
the employer contributes a portion of the employee's salary 
to a pension account. The employee can voluntarily add 
additional funds, tax deferred, into the account. The 
pension benefit is dependent on the cumulative lifetime 
contributions to the account and the rate of return of the 
investment. Other than the employer's contribution, the 
employer has no further financial liability once the 
contributions have been made. Defined contribution plans 
include profit sharing plans, stock bonus plans and thrift 
savings plans. (Ref 22, pp. 9-18) A defined contribution 
plan that has applicability to a government sponsored pension 
is a thrift savings plan which is presented below. 
a.   Thrift Savings Plans 
Although not widely used in the private sector, 
these plans have been available to federal civilian employees 
since 1987. Participants who are covered under the Federal 
Employee Retirement System (FERS) can elect to defer up to 10 
percent of their basic pay which is placed in an investment 
account. In addition, the federal government will match the 
employee contributions dollar for dollar up to 5 percent of 
49 
basic pay. However, even if the employee elects not to 
contribute any of his salary, the government will still 
contribute an automatic 1 percent to the employee's account. 
The employee benefits from the tax deferred income and any 
appreciation in the account over time. The matching funds 
from the government along with the tax deferred income 
provide a powerful incentive for employees to contribute to 
their account. (Ref 23, p. 44) 
Another key feature of the thrift savings plan is that 
employees can borrow against the account for the purchase of 
a home, medical expenses, education, or financial hardship. 
The account can be invested in any of three funds 
specializing in government securities, stocks or fixed income 
securities. (Ref 23 p. 44) 
Upon termination of employment, the employee can 
rollover this account into an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA), the new employer's retirement plan or the money can be 
left in the account and used as an annuity. This provides a 
portable retirement plan that can be transferred to the new 
place of employment. 
3.   Individual Retirement Accounts 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) are investment 
vehicles that allow individuals to contribute up to $2000 of 
tax deferred income each year. However, if an individual is 
covered by a retirement plan and has an Adjusted Gross Income 
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over a specified amount, the $2000 cannot be tax deferred but 
can still be contributed to the account. The IRA can be 
placed in an almost unlimited number of investment choices 
including mutual funds, stocks, bonds or cash and any income 
earned continues to grow tax deferred. The $2000 of deferred 
income is subject to the FICA tax since the tax deduction 
occurs after the employee receives the income. (Ref 3, pp. 
659-661) When the individual reaches age 59 1/2, the money 
can be withdrawn without penalty and any amount that was tax 
deferred is now taxed at the time of withdrawal. 
Although only 17 percent of all military people 
eventually receive a military pension, the IRS considers 
every military member to be covered by a retirement plan. 
Thus, single service members with an Adjusted Gross Income 
over $25,000 or married with over $40,000 cannot tax defer 
the entire $2000 of income. The IRA deduction is completely 
eliminated for Adjusted Gross Incomes of over $35,000 for 
single taxpayers and $50,000 for married taxpayers. (Ref 24, 
p. 145) 
4.   Salary Reduction Plans 
Salary reduction plans are similar to the thrift savings 
plan, although different IRS rules govern each type of 
investment plan. The two most common salary reduction plans 
are the 401(k) and 403(b). 
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a. 401(k)s 
401(k) plans are voluntary retirement plans offered 
to many employees in the private sector. In this plan, 
employees can elect to defer a percentage of their pretax 
salary, not to exceed $9,240 a year (1994 limit). (Ref 24, p. 
131) Typically the employer will match a portion of the 
member's contribution up to about 5 percent of the base 
salary. The combined total contribution from an employee and 
employer cannot exceed 25 percent of the employee's salary or 
$30,000, whichever is less. (Ref 24, p. 132) The employee 
usually has a wide variety of investment options to choose 
from, including stock and bond mutual funds as well as more 
conservative money market accounts. The employee has the 
flexibility to contribute to several investments 
simultaneously or change the asset allocation between 
investments as the employee's needs or investment strategy 
changes. 
The employee's contribution (unlike an IRA) is deferred 
compensation and therefore does not appear on the W-2 form. 
Consequently, the contribution escapes federal, and usually 
state, Social Security and other taxes. (Ref 3, p. 636) 
Employees are typically eligible to contribute to a 
401 (k) within 1 year of employment. If the funds are 
withdrawn before age 59 1/2 without being rolled over into 
another tax deferred retirement account, penalties are 
imposed on the withdrawal as high as 10 percent and the 
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amount withdrawn is also subject to federal and state income 
taxes. (Ref 24, p. 131) It is also possible for employees to 
borrow from their 401(k) savings without penalties if certain 
restrictions are met such as severe financial hardship. 
The growth of 401(k) plans in corporate America has been 
tremendous. Fully 96 percent of companies with greater than 
5000 employees offer 401(k) plans. While the incidence of 
401(k) plans among companies with less than 100 employees is 
only 12 percent, 90,000 are expected to start 401(k) plans 
over the next 5 years.  (Ref 2, p. 38) 
Jonathan D. Pond, one of America's most respected 
financial planners, considers 401(k) plans "the most 
attractive tax advantaged investment vehicles your money can 
buy".(Ref 3, p. 635) 
b. 403(b)s 
The 403 (b) or Tax Sheltered Annuity, is the non- 
profit private sector's answer to the 401(k). Similar to a 
401(k), the employee contributes a certain percentage of his 
salary each month to an investment vehicle of his choosing. 
Ordinarily, the employee contribution limit is $9500 annually 
or 20 percent of the base salary, whichever is less. (Ref 24, 
p. 132) Usually matching funds are also contributed to the 
employee's account by the employer. Typically between 3 and 
25 stock and bond mutual funds are available to choose from. 
Unlike a 401 (k), a 403(b) is a contract that an employee 
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signs with an investment company. The contract is replete 
with restrictions and significantly reduces the flexibility 
and control of the assets by the employee. 
Large cash penalties are imposed if the employee chooses 
to roll over or transfer the funds to another retirement 
account within a specified period of time. These penalties 
can be as high as 7 percent of the total assets but are 
gradually reduced to zero percent over a period of 5 to 7 
years. Limitations are also imposed on the transfer of 
assets between investments within the 403(b) account, which 
reduces the flexibility of the investment strategy. As with 
a 401(k), severe tax penalties are imposed if the funds are 
withdrawn before age 59 1/2. (Ref 3, pp. 645-649) 
Salary reduction plans have shifted more responsibility 
for retirement planning from the corporations to the 
individual. 401(k) and 403(b) plans offer a wide array of 
investment vehicles to chose from and also require a 
dedicated commitment by employees to contribute to and 
actively manage their retirement assets. Employers have 
responded by providing educational seminars that assist 
employees in making retirement decisions. 
C .   SUMMARY 
Private Corporations are increasingly relying on defined 
contribution and salary reduction plans to provide retirement 
benefits for their employees.  This trend is largely the 
54 
result of a changing regulatory environment which has made 
defined benefit plans more costly to corporations. 
A 401(k) plan represents a portable retirement plan that 
can follow an individual through the many job changes which 
occur throughout a worker's life. In addition, the 
prevalence and ease of access to mutual funds have made these 
investment vehicles attractive to the average employee. 
Employees are given tax incentives to contribute to the 
retirement plan, therefore reducing the cost to employers. 
As a result, over 96 percent of corporations with over 5000 
employees have adopted 401(k) plans.  (Ref. 2, p. 38) 
The trend towards 401(k) plans and away from defined 
benefit plans has changed the financial risk to the employee. 
The guarantee of receiving benefits from defined benefit 
plans was previously dependent on the long term financial 
health of only one company. 401(k) plans, through the use of 
mutual funds, can now spread this risk across many companies, 
industries and even countries instead of just one 
corporation. 
Salary reduction or defined contribution plans require 
the employee to take a more active role in providing for his 
retirement. Through employee contributions and investment 
choices, the individual has been forced to actively 
participate in saving for retirement. Corporations have 
dealt with this increased employee responsibility by 
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providing investment and retirement planning seminars as well 
as educational literature to their employees. 
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V.   THE PROPOSAL 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares the normal cost of two options of 
a privatized 401(k) plan for the military to the current 
retirement system. These two options establish normal cost 
boundaries for a privatized retirement plan. A 401(k) plan 
which has a normal cost between these two options is then 
presented as the preferred option for the military. 
The first option is a budget neutral 401(k) plan that 
uses the same allocation rate, or normal cost, as the current 
retirement system which would be applied to every service 
member's 401(k) account. This option is used to establish an 
upper bound on the cost of implementing a privatized 
retirement system. The second plan, which establishes a 
lower bound, is modeled after a 401 (k) plan found in a 
typical American corporation. In this case, the normal cost 
for the government is lowered to 5 percent of basic pay. The 
measure of cost in each case is based on the normal cost or 
the government's contribution to the service member's 
retirement as a percent of base pay. 
The proposed privatized retirement plan is a 
contributory 401 (k) type of plan for the military. The 
normal cost of this plan is 10 percent of base pay, which 
falls between option 1 and option 2 above. The member 
contribution is set at 10 percent. This proposal is one of 
many variations that could be considered by policy makers. 
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The allocation between the service member's contribution and 
government matching funds to the 401(k) account can be 
altered to meet the needs of the military or the individual. 
Finally, the chapter addresses several benefits and 
drawbacks of adopting a 401 (k) plan as well as the annual 
maintenance fees associated with a 401(k) and the phasing out 
of the Military Retirement Fund. 
B.   COSTS COMPARISONS OF MILITARY RETIREMENT PLANS 
1.   Current Military Retirement System 
The normal cost for nondisability retirement benefits 
ranges from 29.8 percent of basic pay for REDUX to 40.0 
percent of basic pay for the FINAL PAY formula. Although, the 
normal cost or accrual rate is applied to every service 
member, they are based, in part, on accruing retirement 
benefits for only the seventeen percent of service members 
who actually reach the twenty year point and retire. 
Retirement benefits that are accrued are deposited into the 
Military Retirement Fund. 
In addition to this accrual accounting system, the 
Department of Defense also calculates the cost and benefit of 
the retirement system by determining the theoretical annual 
deposits necessary for each eligible retired service member 
to accumulate a lump sum equivalent. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
display retirement benefits and deposits necessary under 
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FINAL PAY for officer and enlisted ranks respectively 
retiring in 1994. 
Table 5.1 











0-10 Admiral $4,508 $1,249,290 $2,524 $30,293 
0-9 Vice Admiral $3,958 $1,096,870 $2,216 $26,597 
0-8 Rear Admiral <UH) $3,750 $1,039,228 $2,100 $25,200 
0-7 Rear Admiral (LH) $3,391 $939,739 ' $1,899 $22,787 
0-6 Captain $2,596 $719,423 $1,454 $17,445 
0-5 Commander $2,349 $650,972 $1,315 $15,785 
Table 5.2 











E-9 Master CPO $1,427 $388,004 $784 $9,408 
E-8 Senior CPO $1,251 $340,149 $687 $8,248 
E-7 CPO $1,104 $300,180 $607 $7,279 
E-6 First Class PO $967 $262,929 $53] $6,376 
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Data Source for Tables 5.1 and 5.2: Department of 
Defense, Office of the Actuary, DOD Statistical Report on the 
Military Retirement System, FY 1994. 
Since the lump sum equivalents shown in these tables are 
based on FINAL pay formulas, these values are greater than if 
a similar calculation were completed based on REDUX formulas. 
The lump sum equivalent shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is 
the equivalent amount of money needed at the time of 
retirement to provide a lifetime annuity for the service 
member. The lump sum equivalents provide a "target" or 
bench mark to compare the accrued benefits of any privatized 
retirement system. The monthly or annual deposits assume an 
investment return in the Military Retirement Fund of 6.75 
percent. (Ref 8, p. 285) 
The Military Retirement Fund invests in conservative 
government securities and consequently yields a lower return 
than riskier investments such as stocks. Many private 
retirement plans such as 401(k)s allow employees to invest in 
a wide variety of investments. Most financial planners 
advise their clients that retirement savings for young people 
should be primarily invested in more aggressive investment 
vehicles such as stocks or stock mutual funds. One financial 
planner remarks "stocks have consistently proven to be the 
best inflation-beating investment around". (Ref 3, p. 497) 
Stocks have returned on average 11.2 percent over the past 20 
years, significantly outperforming the 7.7 percent return of 
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U. S. Treasury securities over the same period. (Ref 3, p. 
431) 
2.   Option 1:   Non-contributory 401(k)  -  29.8% 
Government Matching. 
Option 1 is a budget neutral noncontributory 401(k) 
plan described here to establish an upper bound on the normal 
cost, or government contribution, to a 401(k) account for the 
military. The government's contribution remains at 29.8 
percent of basic pay but is applied to every service member's 
401(k) account instead of the Military Retirement Fund. The 
29.8 percent accrual rate is based on the identical normal 
cost under the current REDUX retirement formula. The total 
outlays for military retirement would not change since the 
normal cost per service member is held constant. Table 5.3 
shows the retirement accrual for a typical officer retiring 
after 20 years of service, under this option. 
The 401(k) account is assumed to be invested in a 
diversified stock mutual fund yielding 11.2 percent, the 
average return over the past 20 years. After twenty years of 
service, a typical officer can expect to have accrued 
$663,587 in a retirement, account. This option accrues 
benefits proportional to a member's base pay and covers all 
service members with the identical cost to the government as 
the current plan. The data in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 do not take 
inflation into consideration and therefore no COLAs are 
applied to base pay over time. 
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Table 5.3 
401(k)   Savings Plan with 29.8  Percent Matching 
(Budget Neutral) 













1 0-1 $1636.20 0 $487.59 $487.59 $5,851 
2 0-1 $1636.20 0 $487.59 $487.59 $12,357 
3 0-2 $2058.00 0 $613.28 $613.28 $21,101 
4 0-2 $2556.00 0 $761.69 $761.69 $32,604 
5 0-3 $2858.10 0 $851.71 $851.71 $46,477 
6 0-3 $2994.90 0 $892.48 $892.48 $62,392 
7 0-3 $2994.90 0 $892.48 $892 .48 $80,089 
8 0-3 $3102.30 0 $924.49 $924.49 $100,153 
9 0-3 $3102.30 0 $924.49 $924.49 $122,464 
10 0-3 $3270.30 0 $975.55 $975.55 $147,875 
11 0-4 $3432.00 0 $1022.74 $1022.74 $176,710 
12 0-4 $3624.90 0 $1080.22 $1080.22 $209,464 
13 0-4 $3624.90 0 $1080.22 $1080.22 $245,886 
14 0-4 $3790.20 0 $1129.48 $1129.48 $286,979 
15 0-4 $3790.20 0 $1129.48 $1129.48 $332,6745 
16 0-4 $3956.70 0 $1179.10 $1179.10 $384,083 
17 0-5 $4313.10 0 $1285.30 $1285.30 $442,525 
18 0-5 $4560.00 0 $1358.88 $1358.88 $508,394 
19 0-5 $4560.00 0 $1358.88 $1358.88 $581,640 
20 0-5 $4698.60 0 $1400.18 $1400.18 $663,587 
Total Accrued $663,5871 
Note:     Numerical values may not add up exactly due  to roundng 
3.       Option   2    -   Typical   civilian   401(k)    Plan 
Option 2  is modeled after a typical civilian 401(k)   plan 
with    a    10    percent    member    contribution    and    5    percent 
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government matching. The normal cost for the government is 
reduced from 29.8 percent to 5 percent of base pay. This 
represents a reduction in government outlays of 83 percent 
Table  5.4 
401(k)   Savings Plan with 5  Percent Matching 
&  10  Percent Member Contribution 













1 0-1 $1636.20 $163 $81 $245 $2,945 
2 0-1 $1636.20 $163 $81 $245 $6,220 
3 0-2 $2058.00 $205 $102 $308 $10,621 
4 0-2 $2556.00 $255 $127 $383 $16,412 
5   • 0-3 $2858.10 $285 $142 $428 $23,394 
6 0-3 $2994.90 $299 $149 $449 $31,405 
7 0-3 $2994 .90 $299 $149 $449 $40,313 
8 0-3 $3102.30 $310 $155 $465 $50,413 
9 0-3 $3102.30 $310 $155 $465 $61,643 
10 0-3 $3270.30 $327   « $163 $490 $74,434 
11 0-4 $3432.00 $343 $171 $514 $88,948 
12 0-4 $3624.90 $362 $181 $543 $105,435 
13 0-4 $3624.90 $362 $181 $543 $123,768 
14 0-4 $3790.20 $379 $189 $568 $144,453 
15 0-4 $3790.20 $379 $169 $568 $167,454 
16 0-4 $3956.70 $395 $197 $593 $193,331 
17 0-5 $4313.10 $431 $215 $646 $222,747 
18 0-5 $4560.00 $456 $228 $684 $255,903 
19 0-5 $4560.00 $456 $228 $684 $292,772 
20 0-5 $4698.60 $469 $234 $704 $334,020 
Total Accrued $334,020 
Note:     Numerical values may not  add up exactly due  to roundng 
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from the current retirement system even after covering all 
service members. Table 5.4 shows the retirement accrual for 
a typical officer retiring after 20 years of service under 
this option. As with option 1, the 401(k) account is assumed 
to be invested in a diversified mutual fund yielding 11.2 
percent, the average return over the past 20 years. This 
plan accrues over $334,000 for a typical officer retiring at 
20 years of service. 
Both option 1 and option 2 above accrue significant 
retirement benefits under a 401(k) plan and still cover all 
service members. This is accomplished at less cost than the 
current retirement system which only covers 17 percent of the 
service members. 
These two options have established the endpoints for 
normal cost accruals for a 401(k) plan. The higher normal 
cost of 29.8 percent is used as one end point and the lower 
normal cost of 5 percent is used for the other to reflect 
equivalence to typical corporate matching funds. The 
proposal presented below establishes the normal cost at 10 
percent which falls between these two endpoints. 
C .   THE PROPOSAL 
A contributory 401(k) retirement plan covering all 
service members with a maximum contribution of 10 percent for 
the individual and 10 percent for government matching funds 
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is proposed.  The individual contribution rate is comparable 
to civilian retirement plans,  while  the  government's 
Table 5.5 
401(k) Savings Plan with 10 Percent Matching 
& 10 percent Member Contribution 













1 0-1 $1636.20 $163 $163 $327 $3,926 
2 0-1 $1636.20 $163 $163 $327 $8,293 
3 0-2 $2058.00 $205 $205 $411 $14,161 
4 0-2 $2556.00 $255 $255 $511 $21,882 
5 0-3 $2858.10 $285 $285 $571 $31,192 
6 0-3 $2994.90 $299 $299 $598 $41,873 
7 0-3 $2994.90 $299 $299 $598 $53,751 
8 0-3 $3102.30 $310 $310 $620 $67,216 
9 0-3 $3102.30 $310 $310 $620 $82,190 
10 0-3 $3270.30 $327 $327 $654 $99,244 
11 0-4 $3432.00 $343 $343 $686 $118,597 
12 0-4 $3624.90 $362 $362 $724 $140,579 
13 0-4 $3624.90 $362 $362 $724 $165,024 
14 0-4 $3790.20 $379 $379 $758 $192,603 
15 0-4 $3790.20 $379 $379 $758 $223,271 
16 0-4 $3956.70 $395 $395 $791 $257,774 
17 0-5 $4313.10 $431 $431 $862 $296,996 
18 0-5 $4560.00 $456 $456 $912 $341,204 
19 0-5 $4560.00 $456 $456 $912 $390,362 
20 0-5 $4698.60 $469 $469 $939 $445,360 
Total Accrued $445,360 
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contribution is about twice that of a typical civilian 401(k) 
plan. The objective in choosing these contribution rates was 
to exceed the benefits of a typical civilian retirement plan 
while significantly reducing government outlays. However, 
contribution rates would be smaller for military personnel 
since the normal cost is computed on base pay instead of 
total pay as found in typical civilian 401(k) plans. 
Contribution rates are calculated in terms of base pay 
instead of Basic Military Compensation (BMC) since base pay 
is the only cash compensation that all service members 
receive. 
The data in Table 5.5 shows that a substantial 
retirement benefit could be accumulated by every service 
member with much less cost to the government than the current 
system. The normal cost could be reduced from the current 
29.8 percent of basic pay to 10 percent of basic pay. This 
would eventually result in a 66 percent reduction in federal 
outlays for military retirement and still provide an 
excellent retirement plan for all service members. 
A significant drawback is that the service members who 
eventually retire at the twenty year point would receive less 
lifetime retirement compensation than they would under the 
current retirement system. Table 5.6 compares the lump sum 
equivalents after twenty years of service for each retirement 
plan discussed. 
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Some important differences between the plans shown below 
is that the current system covers only 17 percent while the 
other three cover all service members. In addition, the 
annual rate of return used to calculate the lump sum is 6.75 
percent for the current system and 11.2 percent for the other 
three plans. The differences between lump sum retirement 
equivalents for the current retirement system and the three 
other plans are actually overstated. The lump sum 
equivalents in the current retirement system are based on 
FINAL PAY formulas and not REDUX. However, an estimate can 
be determined for the REDUX formula simply by compounding the 
normal cost of 29.8 percent of base pay at 6.75 percent over 
twenty years. This calculation yields $429,250 as the 
expected lump sum for the REDUX formula for a commander 
retiring after twenty years. 
Table 5.6 
Comparison of Lump Sum Equivalents 











FINAL  PAY 0 40.0% 6.75% $650,972 
REDUX 0 29.8% 6.75% $429,250 
Option 1 0 29.8% 11.20% $663,587 
Option 2 10% 5% 11.20% $334,020 
The  Proposal 10% 10% 11.20% $445,360 
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The proposed 401(k) retirement plan would still be more 
generous than most private sector retirement plans, since the 
10 percent matching funds would be twice that found in a 
typical private sector 401(k) plan. 
A concomitant pay raise to offset the member's 
contribution may not be necessary. The voluntary 
contribution by the service member is actually nothing more 
than a service member's savings account and therefore there 
is no apparent monetary loss to the service member. However, 
there is a perceived loss in that there is a loss of 
disposable income which may be justification for an increase 
in current compensation. In addition, the government's 
matching funds applied to the member's 401(k) account would 
more likely appear to the service member as visible current 
compensation and would thus be valued more than deferred 
compensation. RAND Corporation remarks on this issue: "Young 
people are known to have high personal discount rates, much 
higher than the government's, and therefore value a dollar of 
deferred (retirement) compensation less than it costs the 
government to provide."  (Ref 1,  pp. 19-20) 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the current 
military retirement system may see benefits eroded by' 
congressional action. This is being driven by the cost of 
military retirement and the desire to reduce federal 
expenditures. In addition, the military retirement system 
only provides benefits for the few career service members who 
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stay in the service for twenty years or more. Adopting a 
service member contributory 401(k)-type plan will alleviate 
these problems and may still meet the objectives of using 
military retirement as a force management tool. 
In a recent Washington Times article, Gregory McCarthy, 
a former active duty Marine officer, commented on military 
retirement reform. 
The all-or-nothing 20 year demarcation is damaging 
to both the service and the individual, encouraging 
careerism and punishing all but those who serve a 
full career. Clearly a 401(k) style system of 
matching contributions would be superior. (Ref 25) 
D.   BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF ADOPTING A 401(k) 
1. Benefits 
The benefits of privatizing military retirement for the 
military, the individual and the country could be enormous. 
The most apparent benefit would be to provide a retirement 
plan that includes all service members and not just the small 
minority who stay in the military for twenty years or more. 
A 401(k) plan with 10 percent matching would be a retirement 
plan that would greatly exceed that found in a typical 
private corporation while covering all service members. The 
normal cost to the government would be 10 percent per 
employee instead of the 29.8 percent currently allocated to 
the Military Retirement Fund. 
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Congress would be unable to retroactively reduce accrued 
benefits since these benefits would be in individual accounts 
instead of a government trust fund. Therefore the security 
of the retirement system would be enhanced, which in turn 
would increase the service members' confidence in the 
retirement system. 
Accrued retirement benefits would be invested in 
corporations through 401(k) plans instead of government 
securities. The country would benefit from the increased 
capital available for corporations to expand and create jobs 
which will contribute to the long term prosperity of the 
economy. 
2.   Drawbacks 
A 401(k) retirement plan requires the active 
participation and management of the investments by the 
recipient instead of the government. A rudimentary 
understanding of investments and retirement planning would be 
necessary if the long term retirement objectives are to be 
met. Since the military consist largely of young people, 
many of whom are inexperienced investors, this may pose a 
problem. However, the military does not have a monopoly on 
young inexperienced investors. Corporations have the same 
issues facing their employees and have dealt with this 
problem through retirement education and training. 
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Some service members may elect not to participate in 
such a retirement system. Young individuals tend to be more 
concerned with short term goals rather than providing for 
their own retirement. The military may remedy this problem 
by making participation mandatory. A 401(k) account would be 
established in the member's name and the government would 
contribute the maximum matching funds of 10 percent of base 
pay to this account. Thus retirement benefits would still 
accrue for the service member based on the government's 
contribution rate. 
The 401(k) investments would be subject to the short 
term risk of the financial markets and the long term 
financial risk of the economy as a whole. The accrued 
retirement benefits could be invested in mutual funds 
diversified in hundreds of corporations in the U.S. and even 
world wide. As with any mutual fund, the portfolio would be 
designed and managed by a portfolio manager offering 
professional investment management. With the current 
retirement system, the accrued benefits are invested in a 
trust fund that is paid out based on a promised retirement 
formula when the service member reaches the twenty year point 
and retires. 
The financial risk of the current military retirement 
plan lies with the financial health of the government and its 
willingness to fund the retirement system in the future. 
Given the recently proposed legislation to retroactively 
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reduce military retirement benefits and the current austere 
budgetary climate, the greater risk may be with the current 
retirement system. 
The final drawback of adopting the proposed 401(k) plan 
is that the accrued retirement benefits could not be drawn 
upon until age 59 1/2 instead of at the current twenty year 
point. This may make a retroactively imposed 401(k) system 
politically infeasible and therefore, the 401(k) plan should 
only be introduced with new entrants. 
The added economic risk of the financial markets is a 
also a concern. The lifetime benefits under the proposed 
plan is dependent on the investment choices and financial 
health of the economy and subsequently there is no guarantee 
that expected returns will be realized. However, a 401(k) 
plan that covers all service members is a better option for 
new entrants into the military. For example, if an 0-1 or E- 
1 entering service were given the option of a 17 percent 
chance of receiving a great retirement plan (the current 
retirement system) or a 100 percent chance of receiving an 
above average retirement plan (the proposed 401(k) plan), the 
choice would appear to be clear. 
E.   MAINTENANCE COSTS AND MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATIZING 
MILITARY  RETIREMENT 
The cost to set up and manage 401 (k) plans is 
insignificant.  Large companies such as General Motors, that 
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have over 200,000 employees, have a very small cost per 
employee. In many cases the installation and annual 
maintenance fee are waived completely where 401(k) providers 
stand to gain a large client. Additionally, the annual fees 
charged to the employee's account are usually as low as $5 
per year per employee. (Ref 27) 
Since the account is managed by the 401(k) provider, the 
employer has no other responsibilities or liabilities with 
the account other than funding the contributions. The 
contributions are usually transferred to the employee's 
account through a payroll deduction. This essentially 
removes any control by the employer over the retirement 
benefits once they have been funded. However, this presents 
a particular problem for the military's goal for using 
retirement benefits as a force management tool and is 
addressed in the following chapter. 
F.   PRIVATIZATION AND THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND 
The Military Retirement Fund was created as a trust fund 
to accrue future benefits for nondisability retirement pay, 
disability pay, survivor benefits and reserve retirement. 
Privatizing military retirement would eliminate the need for 
this fund since accrued benefits would be paid into 
individual 401(k) accounts. Nondisability retirement pay, 
reserve retirement pay and survivor benefits could be 
directly funded into the individual's 401(k) account.  For 
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REDUX formulas, the allocation rate (taken from Table 2.1) is 
0.7 percent of base pay for survivor benefits, and 9.3 
percent for reserve retirement. 
Disability pay may need a "stand alone" trust fund to 
fund benefits for disability pay because this program is more 
of an insurance program than a retirement plan. Service 
members may not have enough accrued assets in their own 
individual retirement accounts to provide for their income 
needs in the event of disability. A trust fund could be 
created that is funded by the same allocation rate of 1.0 
percent applied to every service member's base pay. 
Disability benefits would therefore remain essentially 
unchanged. 
The logical process for adoption of a privatized 
military retirement plan would be to phase in 401(k) accounts 
with new military recruits and slowly phase out the Military- 
Retirement Fund. There would be no effect on the promised 
retirement benefits on current retirees or service members. 
Another option would be to allocate the assets in the 
Military Retirement Fund to all service members based on 
longevity. However, this would be politically infeasible and 
unfair to vested service members to retroactively 
redistribute accrued retirement benefits. The allocation of 
the unfunded liability from the Military Retirement Fund 
would be difficult as well. 
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G.   SUMMARY 
A privatized retirement plan in the form of a 401 (k) 
would be much less costly to the government while covering 
all service members under a retirement system. The normal 
cost for retirement benefits would be reduced from 29.8 
percent to 10 percent (for this proposal) which would 
represents a reduction in federal outlays for nondisability 
pay of 66 percent. However, under the proposed 401(k) plan, 
future twenty year retirees would see a net reduction in 
their lifetime stream of benefits, which would then be more 
in line with civilian plans. If individuals, who are certain 
that they will remain in military service for twenty years or 
more, make career decisions based on the present value of 
their expected lifetime stream of benefits, these individuals 
may decide not to join the military. This problem may be 
alleviated by increasing the government matching funds. 
The problems associated with adopting a 401(k) plan are 
not unique to the military. Corporations face the same 
challenges of encouraging employee participation and 
educating employees on retirement planning. 
The Military Retirement Fund would need to be phased out 
over time as new service members are covered under a 401(k) 
plan.  A trust fund for disability pay should be established 
and funded by the same allocation rate that is currently 
applied to the Military Retirement Fund. 
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VI.   RETIREMENT COMPENSATION AND FORCE MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Force management is a term used by the military to 
describe the process by which the military meets its required 
manpower objectives. This is accomplished by shaping the 
distribution of officers and enlisted personnel, by rank, 
years of service and job specialty. Retaining the required 
distribution of officer and enlisted service members is 
essential for the military to meet its manpower objectives, 
and therefore directly affects readiness. Force management 
is accomplished by several different mechanisms. These 
include special and incentive pays, selected reenlistment 
bonuses, basic pay and retirement compensation. (Ref 19 pp. 
7-18) 
B. CURRENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND FORCE MANAGEMENT 
The military retirement system must simultaneously 
maintain a young, vigorous force and provide promotional 
opportunities for junior personnel. The current system 
which provides retirement benefits only after twenty years of 
service has a dramatic effect on officer and enlisted 
distributions.  Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate this effect. 
The two charts show continuation rates for both officer 
and enlisted service members with various years of service. 
The continuation rate is the percentage of service members 
that stay in the military.  Three significant reductions in 
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continuation rates occur over a typical thirty year period. 
The first reduction occurs between three and five years of 
service which is after the initial enlistment period has 
expired, and a large number of service members leave the 
service. The second occurs at the time the twenty year 
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for retirement benefits. The third and final decline occurs 
at the thirty year point for enlisted personnel, after which 
no further retirement benefits are earned by further military 
service. (Ref 19 pp.  7-18) 
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Clearly, retirement has a dramatic effect on retention 
rates after the initial enlistment period. After the initial 
enlistment obligation expires (3-6 years of service), the 
continuation rates for officers and enlisted members 
consistently increase as the twenty year point approaches, 
only to drop off dramatically when retirement eligibility is 
reached. 
Figure 6.2 
Continuation Rates for Navy Officer 
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RAND completed an extensive study on military 
compensation policies in 1994. They concluded that the 
retirement system provides strong effort and retention 
incentive  to mid-career personnel.     Effort  incentive  is  the 
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motivation to excel and advance. However, the twenty year 
retirement system creates a mid-career bulge and reduces the 
effort incentive of more junior service members because there 
are fewer promotional opportunities available. In addition, 
effort incentive for service members eligible for retirement 
is lowered because they are already guaranteed a retirement 
pension. RAND also concluded that the current retirement 
system is beneficial since individuals are given incentive to 
separate voluntarily instead of being forced to retire. (Ref 
19 p. 118) 
C.   CRITICISMS  OF  THE    CURRENT  MILITARY  RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
Criticisms of the current military retirement system as 
it relates to force management objectives were reviewed by 
the RAND study in 1994. RAND acknowledged that the twenty 
year retirement system does not provide for the active 
management of mid-career service members. Since a service 
member has no accrued retirement benefits prior to twenty 
years, any involuntary separation before this point can have 
significant adverse financial consequences for the service 
member. The services have been reluctant to separate service 
members involuntarily after about ten years of service 
because of this financial hardship. RAND refers to this as 
the implicit-contract problem.  (Ref 19 pp. 19-21) 
80 
Another criticism.of the military retirement system is 
the negative impacts created in the attempt to maintain the 
youth and vigor of the force. Youth and vigor are essential 
for specialties such as infantrymen. However, for 
specialties such as doctors and nurses, where experience and 
costly training are more highly valued, the twenty year 
retirement system inhibits retention of these qualified 
individuals beyond twenty years of service. Another example 
is pilots who, after their typical useful flying career of 
ten to twelve years, are replaced by more youthful officers 
and reassigned to administrative or support jobs. RAND 
comments on this problem: "The creation of (possibly 
unnecessary) infrastructure billets to accommodate 20-year 
careers is another illustration of the implicit-contract 
problem".  (Ref 19 pp. 19-21) 
D.   RETIREMENT PRIVATIZATION AND FORCE MANAGEMENT 
The military retirement system affects force structure 
by offering retirement benefits at a certain point during the 
typical career. Generally, this point is reached after 
twenty years of service, but on occasions such as drawdowns, 
this date has been shifted forward to provide financial 
incentives for service members to leave the military early. 
The current military retirement system has been used 
effectively to encourage voluntary separations during 
drawdowns and create promotional opportunities for more 
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junior members. Any attempt to implement a privatized 
retirement plan should examine its applicability to force 
management. A privatized retirement plan may be a more 
effective and flexible force management tool, but is not 
without its problems. Many private retirement plans, such as 
401(k)s and 403(b)s, are portable. When an employee 
separates from employment, the accrued retirement benefits 
can be withdrawn or "rolled over" into another account. 
These types of retirement plans reduce the incentive for an 
employee to stay with an employer, because there is no 
monetary loss in benefits when the employee leaves. 
Portability would create a substantial problem for the 
military, as retention of experienced service members is 
essential for positions of higher responsibility. One 
objective for retirement policy is to provide an incentive 
for individuals to stay in the military. The military cannot 
recruit individuals from the private sector to command ships 
and airwings. It must develop qualified officers over time 
through training and experience. Thus, the retention of 
qualified officers is essential for the military to meet its 
manpower objectives, and any privatized retirement plan must 
consider the impact on retention and the force management 
objectives of military retirement. 
Several options are available to enable a privatized 
military retirement system to meet force management 
objectives.  These options are presented below. 
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1. Graduated Matching Funds 
A military retirement system might be reformed to link 
accrued rates to years of service. For example, during the 
first enlistment period, when retirement has little impact on 
retention, no matching funds would be applied to the service 
member's 401(k) account. As the service member's longevity 
increases, the matching funds would be increased 
appropriately to encourage retention. To encourage members 
to leave military service later in their career to provide 
promotional opportunities for younger service members, 
matching funds could be lowered with longevity. 
Applying graduated matching funds in this manner would 
minimize the typical mid-career bulge in the personnel 
distribution by reducing the incentive to stay in the 
military at this point. This would be a more flexible and 
efficient force management tool and aid in the proper 
distribution of officers by years in service. 
2. Withholdings for Early Separation 
Another means of discouraging early voluntary separation 
involves applying a penalty to the accrued retirement 
benefits for each separating service member. For example, a 
separation fee ranging anywhere from 0 percent to 100 percent 
could be applied to the balance of the 401(k) account, as a 
disincentive to separate from military service.   If the 
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military needs to increase the retention rate of a certain 
year group or specialty, this separation fee can be used to 
provide a disincentive for separation. 
There is a precedent for this in civilian retirement 
plans. The 403(b) plan has an early withdrawal fee if the 
employee decides to "roll over" the retirement funds. The 
fees are graduated, typically, ranging from 7 percent if 
withdrawn within the first year, decreasing to 0 percent if 
withdrawn after the seventh year. However, the fee is 
applied when the employee withdraws the funds and not 
necessarily when he leaves his job. 
The military system could apply a similar fee structure 
based on longevity which could be tailored to produce the 
desired distribution of officers and enlisted people by years 
of service or job specialty. 
This practice of "fining" accrued retirement benefits 
may be perceived as breaking a contract. However, if the 
practice is acknowledged before the service member enters 
military service, this means of encouraging retention could 
be used effectively. 
3.   Elimination of Retirement as a Force 
Management Tool 
One final option would be to eliminate the military 
retirement system as a force management tool altogether. 
RAND asserts that all the objectives of the military 
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retirement system can be accomplished by other personnel and 
pay policies. (Ref 19, p. 118) However, shifting emphasis 
away from retirement compensation and towards current pay 
would require a significant reliance on involuntary 
separations. This may have a lasting and significant affect 
on morale which could be more costly to the government in 
lost productivity. 
E .   SUMMARY 
Force management is an essential tool that the military 
uses to meet required manpower objectives. One instrument 
used to meet these goals and obtain the desired manpower 
distribution is military retirement compensation. 
Evidence suggests that under the current military 
retirement system, a strong incentive exists for mid-career 
service members to stay in the military for twenty years or 
more. The all or nothing twenty year retirement system 
presents a severe financial penalty in lost lifetime benefits 
for any member desiring to leave military service before 
twenty years of service. Thus, critics argue that the twenty 
year retirement system adversely affects the flexibility and 
management of the force structure by retaining service 
members who aren't needed. 
Privatizing military retirement can remedy some of the 
problems associated with the twenty year retirement system. 
Two options were outlined which showed that a privatized 
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retirement plan may be used as a force management tool by 
altering the funds paid by the government into the member's 
401(k) account or by imposing a separation penalty on the 
accrued retirement benefits. Adding or subtracting 
retirement benefits in this manner can have a substantial 
impact on the distribution and retention of service members. 
This may provide a more flexible force management tool that 
will allow policy makers to more easily achieve the desired 
manpower distribution. A third option eliminates the force 
management objectives of military retirement entirely and 
relies on other personnel policies to achieve the desired 
distribution of service members. 
The privatization of military retirement would allow 
accrued retirement benefits to be in the hands of individuals 
instead of relying on the perceived promise by the government 
to pay out future benefits. In addition, the assets would 
be invested, e.g. in equity mutual funds, which have returned 
on average 11.2 percent over the past twenty years vice the 
expected 6.75 percent return in the Military Retirement Fund. 
86 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY 
The goal of the thesis was to explore the possibility of 
applying private sector retirement options to the US military 
retirement system.   It began with the origins and evolution 
of military retirement which established the purpose, 
context, and logic of the current system. 
The foundations of the current military retirement 
system were established in 1916 and the twenty year vesting 
point was adopted by all four services in 1948. Although 
over ten major studies have been conducted on military 
retirement reform since 1948, the system has remained 
fundamentally unchanged. 
Many of the major studies concentrated narrowly on 
equity, cost reduction or force management. A major 
contribution from the Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation was to establish the objectives of the military 
retirement system. These objectives are to provide a 
competitive retirement plan, promotional opportunities for 
younger service members, future economic security, and a pool 
of experienced personnel who would be subject to recall to 
active duty during time of war or national emergency. 
The creation of the Military Retirement Fund and the 
adoption of accrual based accounting in 1984 made military 
retirement more visible in the Federal Budget. Congress was 
now required to fund retirement benefits as they were earned, 
87 
thus making the apparent cost of new entrants into the 
military more evident. This has placed more pressure on 
reducing the cost of retirement benefits. 
Military retirement costs between 1.2 and 2.0 times more 
than civilian retirement plans. In 1993, the Military 
Retirement Fund paid out 25 billion dollars to retirees, 
representing a sizable percentage of national defense 
resources. Historically, military retirement policies have 
been used as a force management tool to encourage separation 
of personnel during drawdowns, provide promotional 
opportunities for younger service members or to retain 
service members when needed. However, since 1981, the 
majority of the legislative changes to military retirement 
have specifically been targeted to reduce the cost of the 
program. 
One cause of the high cost of military retirement is the 
early age at which service members become eligible and 
receive benefits. These benefits continue to be received 
throughout the retiree's lifetime and therefore sum to a 
substantial benefit for the recipient. The average age that 
a service member retires from military service is 42 for 
enlisted and 46 for officers, far younger than the private 
sector average of 62. An enlisted person can retire from 
military service as early as age 37. 
Despite the tremendous cost of military retirement, the 
system does not cover all service members.  Only sixty five 
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percent of all new officers and fourteen percent of all new 
enlistees actually reach the twenty year point and receive 
retirement benefits. This yields a weighted average of 
seventeen percent for all personnel. 
The high cost of military retirement coupled with 
relatively few beneficiaries has created a perceived 
generosity in military retirement benefits that greatly 
exceeds that found in a typical private sector retirement 
plan. As    a    result,     some    in    Congress    have    proposed 
legislation intended to dramatically reduce retirement 
benefits,   in some cases  retroactively. 
DOD budgets for military retirement benefits by 
determining an allocation rate which is applied to the base 
pay of every service member. The allocation rates (or normal 
cost) per service member that are deposited into the Military 
Retirement Fund range from 40 percent for FINAL PAY formulas 
to 29.8 percent for REDUX. The normal cost is based, in 
part, on accruing retirement benefits for the seventeen 
percent of service members who actually retire. 
The retirement plans that the private sector relies upon 
to    compensate    employees    were    then    explored. Private 
corporations offer traditional pensions, 401(k)s, 403(b)s and 
several other plans to provide for employee retirement 
benefits. The trend in corporate retirement plans has been 
towards 401(k) salary reduction plans. Over 96 percent of 
corporations   with   over   5000   employees   have   adopted   401(k) 
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plans. (Ref. 2, p. 38) This trend is largely in response to 
a changing regulatory environment, but is also a result of 
corporations attempting to reduce their costs. 
A 401(k) plan that covers all service members was then 
proposed as an option to provide retirement benefits to 
military personnel. A privatized retirement plan in the form 
of a 401(k) plan would be much less costly to the government. 
The proposed 401(k) plan would eventually decrease federal 
outlays for military retired pay by 66 percent, as new 
entrants join under the new plan, while covering all service 
members. 
However, a 401(k) retirement system requires a 
rudimentary knowledge of investing and more active 
participation by the employee. Corporations have faced the 
same problems and have dealt with them by providing education 
and retirement planning seminars. In addition, the proposed 
401(k) plan, would only allow retirement benefits to be drawn 
upon after age 59 1/2 instead of at the current twenty year 
point. Even though the accrued retirement benefits would be 
greater under the proposed plan they can not be withdrawn 
until age 59 1/2 without substantial penalties. This would 
put military retirement compensation in line with many other 
private sector retirement plans. 
A significant benefit of the proposed plan is that all 
service members would be covered under a retirement system. 
In addition, service members would have control of their 
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accrued retirement benefits instead of relying on a trust 
fund with a promise to make payments based on a retirement 
formula that may be changed in the future. 
Finally, the force management objectives of the current 
military retirement system were reviewed and applied to a new 
privatized retirement plan. Studies have shown that the 
current twenty year retirement system encourages careerism, 
may retain unnecessary service members and encourages needed 
officers and enlisted to separate at the twenty year point. 
A 401(k) plan provides a portable retirement option for 
employees, which reduces incentives for employees to stay 
with one corporation. Since the military .cannot hire 
experienced qualified individuals to command ships and 
squadrons, retention is essential. A 401(k) plan could be 
used to accomplish retention goals by providing variable 
matching funds based on longevity depending on the desire to 
retain or release a group of service members. A 401(k) type 
of retirement system could be tailored to be a much more 
effective and flexible force management tool for the 
military. However, there has been no serious study of the 
effects on manpower distribution and other force management 
issues resulting from privatizing military retirement. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
The military retirement system is generous, expensive 
and may be difficult to justify in today's austere budgetary 
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climate. A retirement system should cover all service 
members and not just the few who stay in the military for 
twenty years or more. 
The thesis has provided a framework that policy makers 
may use to reinvent military retirement. It was shown that 
a privatized plan will cover all service members at much less 
cost, while allowing greater personal financial control and 
flexibility. A 401(k) plan that allows access to stock 
mutual funds and greater returns than the current Military 
Retirement Fund will provide more benefits to the service 
member for less cost to the government. Some of the current 
military retirement system's shortcomings can be rectified by 
reducing the costs (therefore the benefits), by allowing 
earlier than twenty year vesting or by covering all service 
members. However, defined pension plans such as the current 
military retirement system cannot simply be modified to take 
advantage of greater returns, portability or allow for 
greater personal control. 
Privatizing military retirement will eliminate most of 
the functions that the Military Retirement Fund performs. 
Accruing benefits for nondisability pay, survivor benefits 
and reserve retirement will be accomplished by the 401(k) 
retirement plan. However, disability pay would need its own 
trust fund to provide disability insurance for service 
members. This new trust fund would use the identical 
allocation rate that is currently being used to fund 
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disability pay. Thus, the current Military Retirement Fund 
should be replaced with a trust fund that provides disability 
only insurance for service members. 
It is recommended that further study be completed on the 
effect that a portable retirement plan may have on retention. 
Significant negative effects on force management may be less 
apparent and .many issues of retention as it relates to a 
portable retirement plan were not addressed. This thesis has 
provided a framework in which a privatized plan could be 
created. Many options are left open for policy makers such 
as changing the government matching rates, vesting 
eligibility, or separation fees. 
A further recommendation is to expand the stated 
objectives of military retirement to include cost 
effectiveness and equity. 
C.   CONCLUSION 
The fate of military retirement is uncertain at best. 
The tremendous cost and generosity of military retirement 
coupled with deficit reduction efforts has focused 
significant congressional attention on this program. Since 
1981, Congress has frequently passed legislation to reduce 
military retirement benefits. In the 1990s, this trend 
appears to be accelerating, with the introduction of several 
bills which would dramatically reduce retirement benefits. 
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Several of these bills actually seek to reduce military 
retirement benefits retroactively. 
A 401(k) plan will put accrued retirement benefits in the 
hands of the service members, minimizing congressional 
control and thus enhancing the security of military 
retirement. In addition, a 401(k) plan will provide coverage 
for all service members at much less cost to the government. 
The time has come to rethink the role of military retirement. 
D.   FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Military compensation encompasses a broad array of 
issues that interrelate and affect each other. This thesis 
has scratched the surface of the issues that encompass 
military retirement. The effects of a privatized retirement 
system on recruitment, retention and motivation have not been 
fully analyzed. 
A similar thesis could be applied to other organizations 
that mirror the current military retirement system such as 
the Coast Guard, the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health 
Service and the Commissioned Corps of the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration. In addition, the possibility 
of privatizing Social Security is an option that could draw 
on some of the research from this thesis. 
94 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. National Defense Research Institute, A Theory of Military 
Compensation and Personnel  Policy.   RAND, 1994. 
2. Barr, Stephen, "Small is Beautiful", CFO: The Magazine 
for Senior Financial Executives, April, 1995. 
3. Pond, Jonathan D., The New Century Family Money Book. 
Dell Publishing, New York, 1993. 
4. Employee Benefits Research Institute, The Changing 
Profile of Pensions in America.   1985. 
5. General Accounting Office, Military Compensation. 
Comparisons with Civilian Compensation and Related Issues. 
June, 1986. 
6. Department of Defense, Report of the Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation:     Uniformed Service 
Retirement  System   (Vol.   I)   .   Lt Colonel J. L. Peel, Fort 
McNair, D.C., December 14, 1987. 
7. Department of Defense, Seventh Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation:     Compensation Structure,  Major Topical 
Summary   (MTS)   1   .   August, 1992. 
8. Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Statistical 
Report  on  the Military Retirement System.   September 30, 1994. 
9. Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Valuation 
of the Military Retirement System.   30 September, 1992. 
95 
10. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Military Compensation Background Pavers,   USGPO, 
Washington, D.C., January 1984. 
11. Nunn, Sam,  Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Congressional Record,   June 30, 1994. 
12. Smithers, Samuel J., Budgeting and Investing in  the 
Military Retirement Fund,   U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 
December, 1993. 
13. President's Commission on Military Compensation, Report 
of the President's Commission on Military Compensation, 
USGPO, Washington, D.C., April, 1978. 
14. Concord Coalition, ALERT 4.   CompuServe, Concord 
Coalition Library, July 10, 1995. 
15. Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: 
Spending and Revenue Potions    February, 1995. 
16. Hardy, Don, ENTITLEM.522,  E-Mail response from Senator 
Simpson's Office, July 14, 1995. 
17. Maze, Rick, "Chopping Retiree COLAs", Naw Times.  April 
10, 1995. 
18. Vise, David A., "Government Has Massive Pension 
Shortfall", Washington Post,   November 22, 1993. 
19. National Defense Research Institute, A Theory of 
Military Compensation and Personnel  Policy.   RAND, 1994. 
96 
20. Congressional Budget Office & General Accounting Office, 
Analysis of the Grace Commission's Major Proposal  for Cost 
Control.   USGPO,   February 1984. 
21. Hagar, George, and Rubin, Alissa J., "Congress Gives 
Resounding Yes To Balanced-Budget Plan", Congressional 
Quarterly.   July 1, 1995. 
22. Clark, Robert L., and McDermed, Anne A., The Choice of 
Pension Plans in a Changing Regulatory Environment,   American 
Enterprise Institute, 1990. 
23. Honan, Stephen E., An Account  for Saving Active Pay 
(ASAP) :  An Employer-Sponsored Savings Plan  for Active Duty 
Military Personnel.   U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December, 
1990. 
24. Lasker, J. K., Your Income Tax 1995.   Macmillan Press, 
New York, New York, 1995. 
25. McCarthy, Gregory C, "Military retirement: A middle- 
class entitlement in need of reform", Washington Times. 
August 18, 1985. 
26. Hamblet, William, "Changing Military Retirement-For the 
Better", U.S.  Naval  Institute Proceedings.   January, 1995. 
27. Hager, George, "Clinton Shifts Tactics, Proposes Erasing 
Deficit in 10 Years", Congressional  Quarterly.   June 17, 1995. 
28. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the 
Armed Forces, Directions for Defense,   USGPO,   May 24, 1995. 
97 
29.  Telephone conversation between Ken Paieski, Vice 
President, Fidelity Institutional Retirement Services Company 
and LT Mark D. Pyle, May 26, 1995. 
98 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barr, Stephen, "Small is Beautiful", CFO: The Magazine for 
Senior Financial Executives, April, 1995. 
Clark, Robert L., and McDermed, Anne A., The Choice of 
Pension Plans in a Changing Regulatory Environment, American 
Enterprise Institute, 1990. 
Concord Coalition, ALERT 4,   CompuServe, Concord Coalition 
Library, July 10, 1995. 
Congressional Budget Office & General Accounting Office, 
Analysis of the Grace Commission's Maior Proposal  for Cost 
Control.   USGPO,   February, 1984. 
Congressional Budget Office, The Military Retirement System: 
Options for Change.   January, 1978. 
Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit:   Spending 
and Revenue Options    February, 1995. 
Federal  Employee Compensation Equity Act of 1987,  USGPO, 
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1987. 
Crensaw, Albert B., "Grabbing the Nest Egg Before it 
Hatches",  The Washington Post National Weekly Edition", 
March 21-27, 1994. 
Department of Defense, Report of the Fifth Quadrennial Review 
of Military Compensation:     Uniformed Service Retirement 
System   (Vol.   I)   .   Lt Colonel J. L. Peel, Fort McNair, D.C., 
December 14, 1987. 
99 
Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Statistical 
ffpnorf: on  the Military Retirement System.   30 September, 1994. 
Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Valuation of 
the Military Retirement System,   30 September, 1992. 
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Military Compensation Background Pavers.   USGPO, Washington, 
D.C., January, 1984. 
Department of Defense Retirement Board of Actuaries, Report 
to  the President and Congress on  the Status of the Department 
of Defense Military Retirement Fund.   31 December, 1992. 
Department of Defense, Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation:     Compensation Structure.   Maior Topical  Summary 
(MTS)   1   .   August, 1992. 
Employee Benefits Research Institute, The Changing Profile of 
Pensions in America,   1985. 
General Accounting Office, DoD BUDGET.   Budget  Impact of 
Proposed Reduced Retirement Fund Payments,   5 June, 1992. 
General Accounting Office, Military Compensation.   Comparisons 
with Civilian Compensation and Related Issues,     June, 1986. 
General Accounting Office, Military Compensation.   Comparisons 
with    Federal  Civil  Service Compensation,     November, 1987. 
Hager, George, "Clinton Shifts Tactics, Proposes Erasing 
Deficit in 10 Years", Congressional  Quarterly.   June 17, 1995. 
100 
Hagar, George, and Rubin, Alissa J., "Congress Gives 
Resounding Yes To Balanced-Budget Pi an". Congressional 
Quarterly,   July 1, 1995. 
Haitibiet, William, "Changing Military Retirement-For the 
Better", U.S.  Naval  Institute Proceedings.   January, 1995. 
Hardy, Don, ENTITLEM.522.     E-Mail response from Senator 
Simpson's Office, July 14, 1995. 
Henderson, David R., The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics, 
Warner Books, New York, 1993. 
Honan, Stephen E., An Account for Saving Active Pay (ASAP): 
An Employer-Sponsored Savings Plan for Active Duty Military 
Personnel.   U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December,  1990. 
House Armed Services Committee, Overview of the Military 
Retirement System,   USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1984. 
Lasker, J. K., Your Income Tax 1995,   Macmillan Press, New 
York, New York, 1995. 
Lawler, Edward E., Pay and Organization Development. 
Addison-Wesley Inc., Reading, Massachusetts,   1983. 
Maze, Rick, "Chopping Retiree COLAs", Navy Times,  April 10, 
1995. 
McCarthy, Gregory C, "Military retirement: A middle-class 
entitlement in need of reform", Washington  Times,   August 18, 
1985. 
101 
National Defense Research Institute, A Theory of Military 
Compensation and Personnel Policy.   RAND, 1994. 
National Defense Research Institute, Military Pay Gaps and 
Cans,   RAND, 1994. 
Nunn, Sam,  Senate Armed Services Committee, Congressional 
Record.     June 30, 1994. 
Pond, Jonathan D., The New Century Family Money Book.   Dell 
Publishing, New York, 1993. 
Public Law 95-595, "Federal Government Pension Plans," 
November 4, 1978. 
Public Law 98-94, Chapter  1A-Department of Defense Military 
Retirement Fund.     24 September, 1983. 
President's Commission on Military Compensation, -Report of 
the President's Commission on Military Compensation.   USGPO, 
Washington, D.C., April, 1978. 
Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed 
Forces, Directions for Defense,   USGPO,  May 24, 1995. 
Smithers, Samuel J., Budgeting and Investing in  the Military 
Retirement Fund.   U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December 
1993. 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, Military Compensation and Personnel 
Retention:  Models and Evidence.   February, 1991. 
102 
Vise, David A., "Government Has Massive Pension Shortfall", 
Washington Post.   November 22, 1993. 
Telephone conversation between Ken Paieski, Vice President, 
Fidelity Institutional Retirement Services Company and LT 
Mark D. Pyle, May 26, 1995. 
103 
104 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2 
2. Library, Code 13 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5002 
2 
3. Department of the Navy 
Office of Program Appraisal 
1400 Navy, Pentagon Rm 4D723 
Washington, D.C.  20350-1400 
Attn:  LCDR Karen Coyle 
2 
4. Navy Department 
Bureau of Personnel (PERS 20) 
Washington, D.C. 20370 
Attn:  LCDR Brandon 
1 
5. Department of Defense 
Office of the Actuary 
Attn.:  Ben Gottlieb 
1600 North Wilson Boulevard 
Suit 400 
Arlington, VA 22209-2593 
1 
6. The Honorable John R. Kasich 
1131 Longworth House Office Building 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
2 
7. LCDR Bill Cloughly 
1401 Wilson BLVD. 4th Floor 
Arlington, VA 22209 
2 
8. Concord Coalition 
1019 19th Street N.W., Suite 810 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
1 
9. Don Hardy 
261 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
U.S. Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
2 
10. Fidelity Investments 
Ken Paieski 
455 Market Street, Suite 850 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
1 
105 
11. Dr.  Richard Doyle 
Code SM/Dy 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
12. Commander Louis Kalmar 
Code SM/Kl 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
13. Captain Ronald William Pyle, USN, Ret. 
886 Cedarcreek Rd 
Blackstone, VA 23824 
14. LT Mark D. Pyle 
1002-5 Pacific Grove Ln 
Pacific Grove, CA 93950 
15. Devone Henry 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Code 92DH 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
16. John E. Mutty 
Code SM/mu 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
106 
